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EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE OR EMPLOYEE FORGED
CHOICE? RACE IN THE MIRROR OF
EXCLUSIONARY HIERARCHY
Harry G. Hutchison*
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) is arguably the most transfornative piece
of labor leqislation to come before Congress since the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). Putting the potential impact of the EFCA
in historical perspective, one commentator contends that the NLRA marked the
culmination of a systematic effort of the Progressive movement that domninated so
much of American intellectual life during the first third of the twentieth century. As
it was widely acknowledged at time time, the NLRA was revolutionary in its
implications for American Labor Law. Less widely recognized were the adverse
effects of this and other New Deal statutes on people of color. Readily available
evidence shows that President Roosevelt's insistence on raising the price of labor
(I) increased unemployment and human suffering, and (2) also widened the
unemployment gap between Blacks and Whites. Today, this wide, if not widening,
unemployment gap remains in effect. Properly appreciated, the consequences of the
New Deal for African Americans persist as an important and under-examined
issue, It is likely that neither Progressive Era labor legislation nor contemporary
efforts tofirther transform the labor market operate in the best interest of African
American citizens. Provoked by the assertion that labor faces a legal crisis and the
claim that the statutory right to organize is a sham, energized by the contention that
time union movement ought to reinvent itself as a robust engine of collective
insurgency against globalization, class-based injustice, and asserted increasing
disparities in income, labor union advocates and hierarchs have offered a number of
ideas that include the necessity of acting like a genuine rights movement,
encouraging open source unionism, and creating alternative (nonunion) worker
organizations.
One of the newest attempts to transform labor relations is the EFCA. The first to
disappear under the EFCA would be a system of union democracy whereby unions
could only obtain the rihts of exclusive representation for firms if they could prevail
in a secret-ballot election. Second, the EFCA would eliminate tile necessity of a
freely negotiated collective bargaining agreement between management and labor and
instead substitute compulsory arbitration. While some labor union advocates contend
that lau ought to be conceived of as a vehicle to democratize tile workplace by
redistributing power in labor markets in favor of workers, while concurrently
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demolishing hierarchical command stnmctures that entrench gender, race and class
lines, this proposal would likely expand labor hicrarchy, labor market cartelization
and diminish the employment prospects of racial mitorities. As sud, the EFCA is
marked by contradiction. This Article deploys Critical Race Refornist theory,
economics and apartheid-era South African labor history in order to shot' that rather
than embraciqg freedom for workers, elimiuatioW, poverty, and cxpandi.
opportunities for all, this proposal would likely invert such goals and instead operate
consistently n'ith the record of exclusion and subordination tied to American
Promressivism and the labor movement.
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INTRODUCTION
Kichard Epstein notes that the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA)
"is the most transformative piece of labor legislation to come before
Congress since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 (NLRA).'  Placing the potential impact of EFCA in historical per-
spective, Epstein contends that the "NLRA marked the culmination of a
systematic effort of the Progressive movement that dominated so much of
American intellectual life during the first third of the twentieth century.
'
-
I. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 1
(2009) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACTI.
2. Id.
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Although the NLRA's revolutionary implications were widely acknowl-
edged at the time,' the adverse effects of the NLRA and other New Deal
labor statutes on people of color are not recognized today.
The NLRA represents a progressive turn in American labor rela-
tions.' However, it is likely that neither Progressive Era labor legislation
nor contemporary efforts to further transform the labor markets operate
in the best interest of African Americans. Evidence shows that President
Roosevelt's insistence on raising the price of labor (1) increased unem-
ployment and human sufferings and (2) widened the unemployment gap
between Blacks and Whites." This unemployment gap, which contributes
to the economic isolation of African Americans, persists. The Black un-
derclass has grown disproportionately in recent years Between
December 2008 and May 2009, the unemployment rate for White work-
ers ranged between 6.6% and 8.6% while the rate for Blacks ranged
3. Id. at 4.
4. This remains true even though subsequent amendments to the NLRA in 1947
made "it clear that the NLRIA respected employees' collective choice on unionization,
but did not put its thumb on the scale in favor of [unions]." See EPSTEIN, THE CASE
AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, suipra note 1, at 2.
5. Harry G. Hutchison, iat Workers Want or 4hat Labor Experts Want Them to
Want?, 26 QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW 799, 825 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Hutchison, Wiat
Workers Want].
6. See RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT
AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 272-79 (1993). Vedder and Galla-
way show that racial differences in terms of unemployment rates were essentially
nonexistent between 1890-1930; however, during the 1930s, federal government initia-
tives to raise wages actually widened the unemployment gap between Black and White
workers and contributed to increased income inequality. The following table captures the
widening gap:
RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
YEAR WHITE NONWHITE
1890-1930 (average) 5.82% 5.90%
1940 9.500 10.89/0
1950 4.9% 9.0%
1975 7.8% 13.8%
1990 4.7% 10.1%
See id. at 272.
7. HENRY Louis GATES, JR. & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE Xii
(1996).
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between 11.9% and 14.9%." The consequences of the New Deal on Afri-
can Americans remain an under-examined issue.
Historically, a number of individuals, including scholars, politicians,
and unionists, advanced labor law reform as part of a Progressive agenda.
The original progressives were simultaneously conservative and liberal."
Consistent with this observation, early reforms to labor legislation were
tarnished by contradiction. American Progressivism, from which today's
political Liberalism descends,' contributed to the expansion of both gov-
ernment'' and authoritarianism, and has helped to spawn econonfic and
social nationalism-statism. 12
The modern political life of democratic nations owes much of its
force to the American and the French Revolutions.'3 During the French
Revolution, "the idea that truth was made rather than found began to
take hold of the imagination of Europe."'4 Anticipating the concept of
human progress, American Progressivism and the New Deal echo at-
tempts by French revolutionaries to instigate "totalitarian democracy."'"
Derived from the Age of Reason,", the French Revolution demonstrated
that the unconstrained pursuit of the "natural and imprescriptible rights of
man""7 gives rise to a paradox. The French Revolution aimed to destroy
hierarchy but was powerless to free itself from its own hierarchical and
8. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES: EM-
PLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY RACE, HISPANIC OR
LA'rINO ETIINICITY, SEX, AND AGE (2009), ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/
aa2008/pdf/cpsaat5.pdf.
9. David E. Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Exclding Unfit Workers: Social Coni-
trol Versus Social Justice in the Age qf Ecoiiomic Reformi 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 179
(2009).
10. JONAH GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
LEFT FROM MUSSOLINI TO THE POLITICS OF MEANING 15 (2007) [hereinafter GOLDBERG,
LIBERAL FASCISM].
1t. See Randall G. Holcombe, The Growth of the Federal Goverinient in the 1920s, 16
CATO J. 725, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjl6n2-2.htn (showing
relatively stable government spending through the nineteenth century and into the twen-
tieth century except for periods of war, until the Progressive Era, during which
government spending rose continuously).
12. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 38-43.
13. See DAVID ANDRESS, THE TERROR: CIVIL WAR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1
(2005).
14. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 3 (1989).
15. SeeJOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 194 (1993).
16. ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 1-2. But see GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note
10, at 41 (explaining that the French Revolution, which is often mistaken as the well-
spring of rationalism, was actually a romantic spiritual revolt attempting to replace the
Christian God with ajacobin one).
17. See ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 1; GRAY, supra note 15, at 194.
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tyrannical impulses."' Accordingly, the Revolution marginalized the many
for the benefit of the few, transforming the notion of justice into an at-
tractive illusion." This hopeless descent into darkness led people to use
cruelty as a vehicle of societal transformation."
Both the French Revolution and Lenin's Russian Revolution origi-
nated with the Enlightenment." Both revolutions were incited by a
sentimental faith in humanity grounded in scientific knowledge." The
idea of a self-consciously planned society found later expression in New
Deal efforts to remake the world through progressive values.2-
Labor reformers viewed "the working poor and other economically
marginal groups with great ambivalence!' ' 21 Progressive reformers "de-
picted the poor as victims in need of uplift but also as threats requiring
social control."' Though progressives supported labor initiatives, they si-
multaneously depicted many groups of poor workers as undeserving of
assistance, "arguing that in the name of social control the labor force
should be rid of unfit workers," including African Americans, women,
immigrants and other so-called "defectives." 21 These ideas gave rise to a
social hierarchy that deemed African American workers as "unemploy-
able.' 27 The negative effects of this marginalization continue to plague
Blacks today.
2
American liberalism, like French liberalism often sacrifices liberty in
order to impose equality.' In France, Robespierre fanatically promoted
"the despotism of liberty"3 ' by creating revolutionary tribunals in which
the same individuals served as judge, jury, and prosecutor and the accused
was deprived of the right to a defense.' Similarly, New Deal labor statutes
18. See ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that revolutionaries "who lived
blameless lives of moral purity, [such as Maximilien Robespierre], were most willing to
consign the innocent to a traitor's death," and that "[tlhose who ended the Terror...
were those who had most profited from it.").
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1-7.
21. GRAY, supra note 15, at 195.
22. Id.
23. For a discussion of New Deal efforts to remake the world through progressive
values, see Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Lawv: A Reply to
Greenfield, 35 DEL.J. OF CORP. L. (2010) (forthconing) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract = 1547163.
24. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 180.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role,
16J. LEGIs. 151, 155-56 (1990).
29. See Roger Scruton, Liberty and Equality, AM. SPECTATORJun. 2008, at 38.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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were a putative effort to guarantee worker freedom, eliminate economic
inequality, and symbolize social justice and the common good.
3 2 Unfortu-
nately, the New Deal birthed a paradox: less freedom, equality, and justice.
In a similar vein, the Soviet experiment awed leading New Deal
economists,5 while many other progressives expressed admiration for the
social movements instituted by Mussolini, Lenin, and Stalin." Admiration of
foreign regimes led to New Deal enactments, which, compelled by the vig-
orous support of labor unions, inaugurated a legal regime that imposed
devastating consequences on African Americans and minorities. As a 1930s
civil rights activist pointed out, "NIRA [National Industrial Recovery Act]
redistributed employment and resources from Blacks-the most destitute of
Americans suffering from the Depression-to the White masses.""5
Over the past several years, politicians and union advocates have put
forward a number of proposals aimed at eliminating employer hierarchy
and increasing union membership. The steep drop in contemporary labor
union density rates,", particularly within the private employment sector,
has reduced labor's bargaining power and also forecasts a decline in labor's
political and social influence.3 ' Taken together, this diminishes the likeli-
hood that labor can reshape America as a collectivist enterprise bred by
elite opinion ."
Provoked by the claim that the statutory right to organize is a
sham,' labor union advocates have offered a number of ideas that include
acting like a genuine rights movement,4" encouraging open source union-
ism," and creating alternative nonunion worker organizations.12 But if
32. See Harry G. Hutchison, Work, The Social Question, Progress and the Common
Good?, 48 J. CAT. LEc. STUD. 59, 98-111 (2009) Ihereinafter, Hutchison, Work, The
Social Question] (book review discussing New Deal labor law efforts).
33. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FAsCIsM, supra note 10, at 102.
34. Id. at 103.
35. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire Juris-
pndence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 120 (1993)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass "].
36. Private sector density fell from around 35% to 36% in the early 1950s to about
7.4% in 2006. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIrsTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE No.
07-0113 (2007), http://www.bs.gov/news.release/archives/union 2_01252007.pdf.
37. Harry G. Hutchison, Compulsory Unionism as a Fraternal Conceit? Free Choice for
Workers: A History of the Right Work Movement, 7 U.C. DAVIs Bus. L.J. 125, 155 (2006)
[hereinafter Hutchison, Compulsory Unionism as a Fraternal Conceit].
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Peter Kellman & Ed Bruno, 7he Employee Free
Choice Act and a Lontg-Term Strategy for Winning Workers' Rights, WORKINGUSA: J. LABOR
& Soc'Y 125, 125 (2008).
40. See id. at 126.
41. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 193-205 (up-
dated ed. 2006).
42. Alan Hyde, Net Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: Theo-
retical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. Scu. L. REv. 385, 385 (2005-2006).
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Andress, a prominent French Revolution historian, is correct, we should
be wary of labor initiatives aimed at creating a new world order for labor
relations, particularly when they are enforced by centralized state power.
4
1
For example, the new world order born from the end of Soviet Commu-
nism, is now no more than a morass of moral ambiguity and expediency.
4
It is possible that attempts to achieve a new world order in labor relations
via the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) will provide a similar oppor-
tunity for abuse and expediency.
Originally proposed in 200745 and reintroduced in March, 2009,
EFCA is one of the newest attempts to transform labor relations 4' by
eliminating NLRA safeguards that protect workers from union intimida-
tion and employers' economic interests. The first safeguard to disappear
under EFCA would be the use of a secret-ballot system as the means for
unions to become the exclusive representatives of employees.4 7 Second,
EFCA would eliminate the requirement of free negotiation between
management and labor and instead substitute compulsory arbitration as
the means for obtaining collective bargaining agreements." Although
some labor union advocates contend that American labor law ought to
democratize the workplace by destroying hierarchical command struc-
tures," this proposal, by contrast, is likely to expand labor hierarchy and
labor market cartelization s" and diminish the employment prospects of
racial minorities. As such, EFCA is marred by contradiction. Rather than
embracing freedom for workers, eliminating poverty and expanding op-
portunities for all, this proposal would likely pervert such goals and
instead operate consistently with the record of exclusion and subordina-
tion tied to American Progressivism and the labor movement.'
43. See ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposed
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act).
46. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R-,. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act).
47. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, suipra note 1, at
9, 21-24.
48. Id. at 9, 54-67.
49. See Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstnction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1988).
50. A cartel is a device created to raise prices. See, e.g., Andrew Dick, Cartels and
Tacit Collusion, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter
Newman ed., 2002). It is made up of members of a particular group or groups. See id.
Members of these groups advance collusive efforts to raise prices within the labor sector
by excluding other groups and individuals. See, e.g., id.
51. See Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum
Wage Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs.
93, 118-126 (1997) [hereinafter, Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of
Minimum Wage Regimes] (examining the exclusionary history of labor unions in the
United States).
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By increasing African American unemployment, widening existing
disparities in income, and furthering exclusions along racial lines, EFCA,
if enacted, is likely to issue forth as another weapon of subordination by
the majority. EFCA would fulfill WE.B. Dubois's prophetic declaration
that "instead of taking the part of the Negro and helping him toward
physical and economic freedom, the American labor movement from the
beginning has tried to achieve freedom at the expense of the Negro.
'
5
2
While Dubois was a progressive himself,-- his warning echoes in the
comments of others who found the New Deal labor regime oppressive.
This Article concentrates on the exclusionary effects of EFCA. Part
I briefly introduces Critical Race Reformist Theory, which represents the
combination of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and classical-Liberal (Re-
formist) approaches to racial discrimination. Critical Race Reformist
Theory provides a useful tool of analysis for discovering harmful pro-
grams and legislation. Part II of this Article looks at the often racist
history of American Progressivism. Part III examines the likely unem-
ployment consequences of EFCA, relying substantially on information
from Canada and analysis provided by economist Anne Layne-Farrar. Part
IV examines American labor law through the lens of American history as
well as Apartheid-era labor history of South Africa. Properly understood,
the enactment of EFCA would vitiate the aspirations of African Ameri-
cans and slow the rate of racial progress while reifying illusory claims
offered by union hierarchs. Borrowing FDR's notion that an idea's worth
should be measured by the results achieved,"5 I contend that a principled
conception of the common good and social justice cannot be advanced
by EFCA; accordingly, this scheme and similar labor proposals 5' ought to
be rejected in order to advance the interest and welfare of individuals and
groups that comprise the most marginalized among us.
52. Bernstein, supra note 35, at 85 (quoting W.E.B. Dubois, The Denial of Economic
Justice to Negroes, THE NEW LEADER, Feb. 9, 1929, at 43, 46).
53. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 102-103.
54. See, e.g., JOIN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 87-88 (1976)
(noting the comments of economist Robert Weaver that the period of pro-labor legisla-
tion did not benefit all racial groups equally and that differentials based on race threatened
to destroy not only the New Deal recovery program but any hope of an egalitarian labor
movement in the United States).
55. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 132.
56. At this writing there is a move afoot in Congress to modify the EFCA proposal.
See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2009, at Al (stating that a half-dozen senators friendly to labor have decided to drop
the card-check provision).
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I.ToWARD A CRITICAL RACE REFORMIST ANALYSIS OF EFCA
Throughout history, America's labor unions have generally treated
minority workers badly. 7 For instance, craft unions often limited mem-
bership to White males.-" Despite this history, union supporters contest
the idea that unions intentionally support racist policies that impose dis-
criminatory effects on members of minority groups. Such contentions,
however heartfelt, seen from the perspective of African Americans, are not
necessarily decisive. Professor Charles R. Lawrence explains why:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that deci-
sions about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors
that can be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense
that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unin-
tentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random,
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, de-
sires, and wishes."'
Critical Race Theory (CRT) maintains that assessing policies on the
basis of intent makes sense with truly grotesque forms of discrimination,
but it is also important to consider the unconscious and incompletely ar-
ticulated nature of racially discriminatory beliefs and ideas that influence
behavior or policy choices."' Reformists, on the other hand, are neither
focused on the unconscious nature nor the culpability of the discrimina-
tion at issue. Instead, reformists concentrate on the rate of racial progress."'
"From a reformist perspective, responsibility should depend on the pro-
priety of what is done rather than the blameworthiness of what was
willed.""' This means that knowledge of the discriminatory consequences
of any labor policy ought to be sufficient to "prove the contention that
the policy in question constitutes a form of racial oppression from a re-
formist vantage point,"'61 unless it can be adequately justified on other
grounds. The paramount objective of the Reformist approach is expand-
ing the economic and social progress of minorities, rather than searching
for provable racist intent.
57. Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee
for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 69, 75-76 (2005).
58. See, e.g., id.
59. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning u'ith
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
60. See id. (arguing that a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimina-
tion is influenced by unconscious racial motivation).
61. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes,
supra note 51, at 101.
62. Id. at 102.
63. Id.
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A convergence of CRT and Reformist approaches calls for an inves-
tigation of socio-legal insights in order to assess the discriminatory effects
of policy."4 This combined approach grants greater deference to the con-
cerns of minorities, who traditionally have been excluded from the
nation's policy calculations. Even though policy makers may not have en-
gaged in intentionally discriminatory behavior, the racially charged
assumptions and the subordinating consequences associated with programs
and policies that disfavor racial minorities cannot be remedied by simply
protesting lack of bad intent.
The impact of a law can result in significant unintended conse-
quences. For example, modern industrial nations have faced job security
issues by enacting job security legislation.6- "The obvious purpose of job
security laws is to reduce unemployment, but that is very different from
saying that this is their actual effect. Countries with such laws typically do
not have lower unemployment rates, but instead have higher unemploy-
ment rates than countries without widespread job protection laws.'..
Given these acknowledged effects, and given the often progressive-
regulatory assumptions that undergird such enactments"' it is possible to
conclude that support for job security legislation support-inadvertently
or deliberately-expands the level of unemployment. This example can be
applied by analogy to labor policies in the United States that may dispro-
portionately disfavor members of racial minority groups and, accordingly,
impede racial progress.
II. RACE AND AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM
An accurate understanding of race, racism, and racialization is essen-
tial to identifying the intersection of race and American Progressivism.
Professor Derrick Bell states the following:
Race, racialization, and racism are largely modern-day con-
cepts. The three concepts, although distinct in meaning,
necessarily developed in tandem.Whereas the concept of'race'
implies 'the framework of ranked categories segmenting the
64. Id.
65. THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECON-
OMY 208 (3rd ed. 2007) [hereinafter SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS].
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCIIWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR., &
GILLIAN L. L. LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 196-201 (4th ed. 2007)
(briefly discussing statutory changes to the at-will doctrine and dismissal standards in other
countries). See also Gail Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contei-
porary Trends in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV., 167, 218 (describing the attempt by a
labor union federation to improve job security through the imposition ofjust cause em-
ploynient laws).
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human population,' racialization denotes the process by which
individuals are assigned membership in those categories. Racism
is a product of the two: the assignment of negative value to the
traits commonly associated with a particular race and the sub-
ordinate ranking of that race on the social hierarchy.6
Bell explains that by the eighteenth century, "species classification
became the dominant pursuit of the scientific community, and the obses-
sion to classify and rank hierarchically the human species resulted in the
institutionalization of physical appearance as social status."" The endeavor
to conceive race primarily in biological terms fits within the science-
based ideology of the Enlightenment. This scientific racism reached its
apotheosis during the period between Charles Darwin's discoveries and
the age of eugenics-a "science" that set the stage for the exclusion of so-
called "unfit" workers from the workplace.7"' Reaching its apex during the
Progressive Era, this ideology required the nation to cede control to elite
revolutionaries and was premised on the inevitability of progress. Similarly,
contemporary progressive ideas often reflect a hierarchy of class and race
suggesting that the "masses" should cede their power to modern-day el-
ites.
For purposes of analysis, I adopt three axioms about race and ine-
quality in the United States.7' The three postulates are (1) Constnictivism:
Race is a socially constructed mode of human categorization wherein
people use marks on the bodies of others to divide the field of human
subjects into subgroups we call "races" for which no deeper justification
in biological taxonomy is to be had;72 (2) Anti-Essentialism: The enduring
social disadvantage of African Americans is not the result of any purport-
edly unequal innate human capacities of the races but rather a social
artifact, which is a product of the peculiar history, culture, and political
economy of American society; 7" and (3) In-grained Racial Stigma: An
awareness of the racial "otherness" of Blacks is embedded in the social
consciousness of the American nation due to the historical fact of slavery.
This stigma continues to exert an inhibiting effect on the extent to which
African Americans can realize their full human potential. 
4
68. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 1-2 (4th ed. 2000).
69. Id.
70. See generally Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 177-204.
71. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 4-5 (2002).
72. See id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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A. Grounds for Suspicion: Race as a Basis for Subordination?
Understanding the link between race, progress, American Progressiv-
ism and EFCA requires a brief review of the history of the Progressive
movement's fugleman, Woodrow Wilson. After winning election in 1912,
he immediately set about to convert the Democratic Party into a progres-
sive party and make it the engine for the transformation of America.7 In
1913, he vowed to pick only progressives for his administration. "' It is
doubtful that these maneuvers, examined from a Critical Race Reformist
perspective, were a positive development for African Americans.77 In fact,
Wilson did much to implement an agenda that created socially con-
structed racial categories, enforced racial disparity, and advanced racial
stigma.
American Progressivism had its genesis in the pursuit of transforma-
tive action-best exemplified by President Wilson's exercise of the levers
of government armed with a philosophical commitment to unchecked
executive branch power. Before he was president, Wilson served as a lead-
ing member of the philosophic vanguard that was beginning to shepherd
the nation through transformation. Writing an eclogue in 1908, Wilson
could not see any reason to limit the coercive power of the state."8 A na-
tion captured by Wilson's chilling commitment to elite-led
majoritarianism, personified by the "Big man" who exercises unrestrained
power on behalf of the masses, is likely to threaten the present and the
future of members of minority groups as well as all who are seen as inca-
pable of self-government.7'
President Wilson, the father of modern liberalism, "8 embarked on an
attempt to create a progressive country shaped by an unconstrained ruler.
He arrested or jailed more dissidents in a few years than Mussolini did
during the entire 1920s and did more violence to civil liberties in his last
three years in office than Mussolini did in his first twelve." '
Early progressives were social Darwinists who believed strongly in
eugenics and presumed that the state could create a pure race, a society of
75. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 104.
76. Id.
77. See Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage
Regimes, supra note 51, at 99-102. See generally Lawrence, supra note 59, at 317-88; Roy
L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Schol-
arship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1994).
78. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 86.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Wilson's suppression of civil liberties included the creation of a domestic
spying program that enlisted citizens to listen in on their neighbors' phones, read their
mail and assist the Army in extracting confessions from Black soldiers accused of assaulting
White women. Id. at 114.
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new men.12 American Progressives concluded that government must sub-
mit to the Darwinian theory of organic life." They viewed government as a
living thing freighted by irresistible impulses and requiring ever-expanding
power as part of the natural evolutionary process." "Governmental 'ex-
perimentation,' the watchword of pragmatic liberals from Dewey and
Wilson to FDR, was the social analogue to evolutionary adaptation. ""
Prominent among the themes that Wilson offered was the advocacy of
progressive imperialism "in order to subjugate, and thereby elevate, lesser
races."'"( He applauded the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philip-
pines," while maintaining fervently that giving Blacks the right to vote
was the foundation of every evil in this country."
Unlike classical Liberalism, which necessitated limited government
in order to protect individual rights and liberties, progressives believed in
an ever-expanding government committed to the proposition that society
was one indivisible whole that left no room for those who did not want
to comply." A progressive slant can be seen in the ideology of Margaret
Sanger and proponents of selective breeding, who emphasized human
perfection coupled with centralized power and restructured social and
economic systems." Using the premise that various races were at different
stages of the evolutionary process," Sanger and others led the fight for
abortion rights and reproductive freedom from a perspective that recalls
the hard racism normally associated with Goebbels or Himmler."-2 While
this pseudo-scientific approach to race has been convincingly disputed by
analysts showing that the concept of race is a socially constructed mode of
human categorization, 3 it represents an ongoing attempt to bring evolu-
tion under human control." Put another way, many progressives saw the
contemporary social and economic position of Blacks as the irremediable,
inevitable effect of Darwinism. This conclusion reinforced their commit-
ment to crafting a link between economic reform, socialism, Prohibition,
eugenics, and the other elements of the progressive agenda, in order to
82. Id.
83. Id. at 86.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 83.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 84.
89. Id. at 87-88.
90. Id. at 270-77.
91. Id. at 260.
92. Id. at 270-274.
93. See, e.g., LOURY, supra note 71, at 5.
94. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, AMERICAN BABYLON: NOTES OF A CHRISTIAN EXILE
236 (2009).
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bring about the "New Jerusalem."' 5 Recalling the French Revolution's
attempt to replace the Judeo-Christian God with a Jacobin one,"6 the
"New Jerusalem" represents a bizarre combination of pseudo-science that
is premised on the evolution of the state.'7 President Wilson, who in his
own words personified the triumph of science and reason in politics, em-
bodied the pseudo-scientific methodology that would institute God's
kingdom on Earth.""
B. Exclusionary Hierarchy and the New Deal
Where Wilson may have been an intentional totalitarian, Roosevelt
became one by default." It was while working as Assistant Secretary of
the Navy under Josephus Daniels, a thoroughgoing racist deeply commit-
ted to progressive reforms, that Roosevelt developed his politics."" When
FDR replaced Herbert Hoover in 1933, "three events were viewed as
admirable experiments: the Bolshevik RIevolution, the Fascist takeover in
Italy, and the American 'experiment' in war socialism under Wilson."""
Individualism in the 1920s had cut the experiment in war socialism short,
so when FDR1 took office, the progressives seized the opportunity to re-
make the world.
'" 2
For some progressives, remaking the world required the liquidation
of what was seen as America's Black and sinister polyglot population.'
3
Typifying this view, H.G. Wells saw Roosevelt as the most effective in-
strument for creating a new world order."'" A progressive understanding of
the new world order materialized through the accumulation of power by
the state. During the French Revolution, one revolutionary anticipating a
future fashioned by such accumulated power, offered the following pro-
posal: Let us be terrible so that the people will not have to be."'"
Emulating this approach,Wells fashioned the New Republic.
And how will the New Republic treat the inferior races? How
will it deal with the black? ... the yellow man? ... the Jew? ...
those swarms of black, and brown, and dirty-White, and yellow
people, who do not come into the new needs of efficiency?
95. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 219.
96. ld. at 41.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 219.
99. Id. at 123.
100. Id. at 126.
101. Id. at 132-33.
102. Id. at 133.
103. Id. at 135.
104. Id.
105. ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 376.
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Well, the world is a world, and not a charitable institution, and
I take it they will have to go."
Driven to remake the world, Roosevelt, before his election, prom-
ised to "act in the name of 'the forgotten man at the bottom of the
economic pyramid.'"""' He called America to move as a trained and loyal
army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline." Still, the
desire to remake the world fails to account for a paradox: the probability
that the unconstrained pursuit of social justice, progress, and the common
good may yield servitude."')
As part of America's pursuit of social justice, FDR nominated Hugo
Black to the United States Supreme Court. Black's ascendancy to the
Court, together with his Klan membership, is consistent with the observa-
tion that the Klan of the Progressive Era was rather cosmopolitan,
thriving in cities like New York and Chicago, and its views were widely
embraced by elite opinion formers."" Often seen as reformist and mod-
ern, the Klan had a close relationship with some progressive elements in
the Democratic Party.'' Aiding this transformative epiphenomenon were
members of the academy representing a constellation of views, including
E. A. Ross, who shared Woodrow Wilson's conviction that social progress,
"inevitable" as it was, had to take into account the "innate" differences in
race."
2
Consistent with this progressive ideology and consequent labor law
reform objectives throughout the period from the Great Depression to
the end of World War II, the unemployment gap between Blacks and
Whites rose, and FDR continued to disregard pleas from Blacks to sup-
port anti-lynching laws and the cry for justice from Blacks who endured
"virtual slavery" in Florida." 3 Scholars committed to the "nobility" of
Progressivism and collectivism"' remember that FDR wanted to save
capitalism from itself but frequently "forget that he changed not only
capitalism but constitutionalism, and the latter unambiguously for the
106. Stephen M. Barr, The Devil's Chaplain, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2004, at 25-
26.
107. AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEw HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRES-
SION 12 (2007).
108. William Schambra, Debating the New Deal, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS: J. POL.
THOUGHT & STATESMANSHIP 16, 19-20, Winter 2007-08, (book review) (stating that
both Hoover and Roosevelt were animated by collectivist impulses).
109. See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 253-54 (1960).
110. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 259-61.
111. Id. at 259-60.
112. Id. at 260.
113. See itfra Part IV.B.1.
114. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKE-
LEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 225-26, 274 (2005).
SPRING 2010]
MichiganJournal of Race & Law
worse.' ' m Among the victims of Roosevelt's questionable constitutional-
ism, are African Americans who endured depredations at the hands of a
selectively interventionist government.
Ill.THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT:
PROGRESS OR MARGINALIZATION?
A. EFCA
This subsection briefly examines the language of the Employee Free
Choice Act proposal. Introduced on March 10, 2009, EFCA is identical to
a bill introduced in 2007. EFCA would amend the NLRA by allowing
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to certify a labor organiza-
tion as the collective bargaining representative without ordering a secret
ballot election if"no other individual or labor organization is currently
certified or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the em-
ployees in the unit.'"'6 EFCA does not provide guidelines and procedures
for the designation by employees of a bargaining representative, but orders
the Board to do so.'
1 7
EFCA also provides a mechanism to remedy the fact that labor un-
ions, after winning the right to represent workers, often fail to obtain
initial contracts that advance their interests."' EFCA, in effect, mandates a
first contract by providing (1) a ten-day period for the employer and the
union to commence negotiations; (2) a ninety-day period beginning on
the date on which bargaining is commenced, or an agreed-upon addi-
tional period of time to reach an agreement. Failure to reach a settlement
enables either party to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (Service) of the existence of a dispute and request mediation; and
(3) that after the expiration of the thirty-day period beginning on the
date on which the request for mediation is made, the Service shall refer
the dispute to an arbitration board established in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Service and the arbitration panel
shall render a decision settling the dispute and such decision shall be
binding upon the parties for a period of two years."'
Disturbingly, EFCA does not provide courts with guidance on
how to review the collective bargaining agreement resulting from the
115. Charles K. Kesler, The New New Deal, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS, Spring 2009,
at 3.
116. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11 1th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
117. Id.
118. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 1, at
19.
119. H.L. 1409 § 3.
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contemplated compulsory interest arbitration award. '2" Although the stat-
ute is inadequate to meet the needs of employers and unions who will be
affected by its compulsory arbitration process,":' EFCA seems to encour-
age the parties to fall back on compulsory interest arbitration rather than
attempt to bargain for a contract.' 2"
EFCA would strengthen enforcement of the NLRA by providing:
(1) injunctions against unfair labor practices during organizing drives, (2)
enhanced back-pay remedies, and (3) civil penalties for employers who
willfully or repeatedly commit unfair labor practices while employees are
seeking representation by a labor organization.' The imposition of en-
hanced penalties attempts to remedy a flawed election process that
encourages impermissible employer hostility."14 Given these and other
claims, it makes sense to look at the empirical data surveyed, compiled,
and adduced, which forecast the impact of EFCA on African Americans
to ascertain whether the proposal echoes past subordinating efforts.
B. The Empirical Evidence
Before examining an empirical assessment of EFCA, which illus-
trates the proposal's economic implications,' 25 consider the principal
arguments offered by supporters of EFCA. EFCA supporters present three
primary arguments that EFCA will reverse the long-term decline in un-
ionization. '2' First, "advocates claim that the NLRA is not working
effectively, which requires the enactment of EFCA to make it easier for
unions to organize workers, and which ostensibly will reverse the long-
term decline in unionization. '"' 27 Second, supporters posit that EFCA will
reduce employer coercion, including "unfair labor practices (ULPs),
which, according to EFCA's proponents, are primarily responsible for the
current low levels of private sector union representation." ''  Lastly,
120. Andrew Lee Younkins, Judicial Review Standards for Interest Arbitration Awards
Under the Eiployee Free Choice Act, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 447, 448 (2008).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. H.R. 1409 § 4 (2009).
124. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreement and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 lowA L. REV. 819, 819, 832, 877 (2005) (suggesting
that the NLRB election paradigm is no longer normatively justified because it regularly
permits conditions, including employer intimidation, that preclude the attainment of
employee choice.); but see Keith H. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in
America, 49 WAYNE. L. REV. 685, 695-97 (2003) (disputing the employer hostility thesis).
125. See Anne Layne-Farrar, An Empirical Assessnent of the Eniployee Free Choice
Act: The Economiic Iniplications, 1, 1-45 (2009), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract =
1353305.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id.
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"[p]roponents argue that, under EFCA, more union and nonunion work-
ers will gain access to better health care, increased wages and a generally
better standard of living, thus improving social welfare."" " While unioni-
zation may expand under this proposal, existing research-including some
studies otherwise favored by unions-contradicts most arguments in sup-
port of EFCA. ""This suggests that the focus on the plight of workers and
employer hostility as justifications for EFCA may conceal other reasons
why union leaders and their allies support such legislation.
1. A Preliminary Analysis of the Effect of Unionization
There is no doubt that unions have suffered a long-term decline in
unionization rates. Explaining this decline is complex. Though EFCA
supporters contend that the steady reduction in unionized workers is "the
result of employer misconduct that has been improperly permitted under
U.S. labor law,""' examining the empirical record of unionization else-
where fatally weakens this contention.' - In fact, "the levels of unionized
workers have declined everywhere in developed economies, regardless of
the labor law regime in effect." 133 Data from fourteen developed countries
shows that "private sector unionization across all countries has been
strongly declining since the 1970s.
'' 3,
Factors other than employer hostility explain the decline in unioni-
zation in America. After all, in the absence of union intimidation, a
successful union organizing campaign requires employees to have an un-
derlying desire to belong to a union, and ample evidence indicates that
modern employees find unions less attractive than past generations of
workers.'3 ' In the United States, a recent Zogby poll found that only six-
teen percent of non-unionized workers would definitely vote to
unionize. 3'6 This supports the argument that the leading factor in the de-
cline in private sector unionization is a lack of worker interest in and
consequent demand for labor organizations. 3 1 In 1992, labor economists
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY
LAB. KEV., Jan. 2006, at 38.).
135. Id.
136. Tim Kane, The AFL-CIO's Disintegration and its Possible Implications, HERI-
"AGE FOUNDATION, Jul. 28, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/wm808
.cfni.
137. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualis,,m as a
Cause of labor's Decline in Employee Representation, in THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTER-
NATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 41, 42 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998)
[VOL. 15:369
Employee Free Choice
Farber and Krueger reported that "demand-side factors" are almost
wholly responsible for the entire decline in the union membership rate
since 1977.' 3" American unions must shoulder a good portion of the
blame for their failures."' Private sector unions continue to lose ground
because they no longer provide their membership with benefits that ex-
ceed their costs.' 4 ' Such evidence casts doubt on assertions that workers
value compulsory unionization and that their preferences are hindered by
employer coercion. Given the survey evidence and the fact that only a
minority of private-sector workers believe that unions are the best vehi-
cles to advance their interest, the employer coercion hypothesis is highly
unlikely."'
Although data shows that workers represented by a union can ex-
pect higher wages,' 4 ' many "[e]conomic studies find most, if not all, of the
gains of union labor are made at the expense of nonunionized workers."' 3
Some studies indicate that union monopolies raise wages of union mem-
bers in exchange for both market inefficiency and inequality."4' Labor
unions produce benefits for union hierarchs and few workers in the name
of the many; it is clear that not all members of the union benefit
equally.' Achieving higher wages for organized workers typically means
increasing the wages of members who keep their jobs while shifting some
workers to lower-wage jobs in the nonunion sector or, alternatively, into
("[S]hifts in general social attitudes respecting individualism have altered the predisposi-
tion of workers to consider collective solutions to workplace problems.").
138. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 6 (quoting Henry Farber and Alan Krueger,
Union Membership in the United States: The Decline Continues, 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. W4216, 1992)).
139. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 6-7.
140. Richard A. Epstein, A Connon Lau for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1407 (1983).
141. Harry G. Hutchison, Liberty, Liberalism, and Neutrality: Labor Preemption and First
Aniendment Values, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 779, 801 n. 146 (2009) [hereinafter Hutchison,
Liberty, Liberalism and Neutrality].
142. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 9.
143. STEVEN E. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT,
MARKETS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 256 n. 55 (1985) (internal quotation removed). This ob-
servation becones more salient when one recognizes that "[flor most workers, all or
almost all their income is derived from the sale of their labor." STEPHEN J. SPURR, Eco-
NOMIc FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 18 (2006).
144. RHOADS, supra note 143, at 256 n. 55. See also Harry G. Hutchison, A Clearing
in the Forest: hIfisin, the Labor Union Dues Dispute with First Amendment Values, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1348-49 (2005) [hereinafter Hutchison, A Clearingq in the Forest]
(explaining how unions affect equality and the economy).
145. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1339-42. The data also
indicate that higher wages for union workers tend to compress the overall distribution of
wages. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 9. Thus, the presence of unions significantly re-
duces the wage differential between industries, between firnms in the same industry, and
also between workers within a firm. Id. at 9-10.
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the unemployment line. 4" This lowers the wage rate paid to individuals
who were already employed in the nonunion sector. "7 This is because a
firm deals with the higher cost per worker associated with a unionized
workforce by reducing the number of unionized positions.'4 " This process
could arise by shifting work patterns within unionized firms or by non-
unionized firms achieving a higher market share."" In addition to
increasing unemployment, unions also tend to slow the growth rate in
employment itself. One study shows that a ten percent increase in the
unionization rate may lead to a reduction in employment growth rates of
up to 1.1%. ' Union members also average fewer hours of work when
compared to nonmembers.' 5' Some estimate that during the second year
after union elections, work hours decrease by eleven percent in plants
where the union was successful.'5 2
Turning to the effect of unions on the economy as a whole, as un-
ion labor costs rise, firms substitute capital for labor, producing a rise in
allocative inefficiencies that lower national production.'" This supports
the argument that unions contribute to both inequality and market ineffi-
ciency.'14 This deduction also coincides with the perception that unions
have a negative impact on the economy '5 and on social welfare.'6 Evi-
dence shows that unions may contribute to a reduction in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of 0.40%, which translates to a loss of $57 bil-
lion in national output.'57 In addition, data shows that unions likely slow
the process of innovation and the overall level of capital investment. ' -" For
example, nonunion firms invest substantially more money on Research
and Development than unionized firms.' "'
International data confirms the deleterious effects of unions. Evi-
dence drawn from Canada shows that unions negatively impact capital
investment.""' In Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
146. Id. at 1349.
147. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 453 (8th ed. 2003).
148. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 10.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Stephen Bronars et al., The Effects of Unions on Finn Behavior: An Enm-
pirical Analysis Using Firn-level Data, 33 INDUS. REL. 426, 444 (1994)).
151. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 10 (showing that union members work about
1.8% fewer hours than their nonunionized counterparts).
152. Id. at 10-11.
153. Id.
154. RHOADS, supra note 143, at 256 n. 55.
155. Id.
156. EIIRENBERG & SMITH, snpra note 147, at 461-62.
157. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 11-12.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 12-13.
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and Development found that a one percentage point increase in bargain-
ing coverage increased unemployment rates by 7.5%, while inflation and
real earnings growth both corresponded with rising labor union represen-
tation rates.161
The overall picture painted by the literature is a mixed one,'1 '2 which
led economist Layne-Farrar to conclude:
Unionization can raise worker wages, but may reduce union-
ized jobs and tends to lower GDP Greater bargaining coverage
maintains real earnings growth, but increases unemployment
and inflation.... As a matter of basic economic theory, the
studies in the literature therefore suggest, but in all likelihood
underestimate, negative unintended consequences from passing
EFCA. 163
As union members' real earnings grow as a result of higher wages the
non-union workforce rises. This results in a decline in non-union, wages,
an increase in unemployment, and a rise in income disparity.
2.The Canadian Experience with Card Check
Canada offers a rich field for evaluating the potential impact of
EFCA on the U.S. labor force for two reasons. ' "First, for the last three
decades union certification procedures in Canada have undergone signifi-
cant changes over time and across provinces, driven by political
considerations rather than economic ones. ' "Second, the similarities in
industrial structure coupled with the economic integration between Can-
ada and the U.S. allow [analysts] to use the Canadian experience as a
natural experiment for the U.S. economy."'" While labor law is deter-
mined at the federal level in the United States, most employers in Canada
are regulated by provincial labor legislation."' Until 1976, all provinces
employed a card check regime for union certification, but after 1976, sev-
eral Canadian provinces experimented with regimes that required unions
to win secret ballot elections."" "As of 2006, half of the Canadian prov-
inces use mandatory voting regimes, accounting for roughly 68% of the
161. Id. at 13-14.
162. Id. at 14.
163. Id. at 14-15.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. Employers subject to federal regulation in Canada include the federal gov-
ernment, airlines, inter-provincial transportation, banking, telecommunications, grain
production, fisheries, and uranium processing. Id.
168. Id. at 15-16.
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Canadian labor force, while the remaining provinces covering 32% of the
labor force rely on card check systems."'(,')
The effect of shifting between card check and mandatory voting re-
gimes shows that a mandatory voting rule significantly reduced the
success of union certification efforts in comparison with a card check sys-
tern. A number of empirical studies make clear that a card check system "
brings a higher success rate for unionization. On one account "between
17 and 24% of the difference in union density between the United States
and Canada can be explained by virtue of the fact that mandatory voting
is more prevalent in the U.S. than in Canada.""'
In addition to "frequent changes in provincial certification proce-
dures, the requirement of first contract arbitration has also varied by
province over time. By 1994, seven provinces had introduced first agree-
ment arbitration that applied to all negotiation efforts.'" - It is possible that
first agreement arbitration also leads to increased unionization.
Developing her own economic model, Layne-Farrar constructed a
data set of Canadian provinces over a twenty-two year period in order to
study the impact of union density on a number of economic outcomes in
Canada.'7 Among other things, she examined the impact of higher union
density resulting from moving to a card check and mandatory arbitration
regime.' 4 A ten percent increase in union density creates a three percent
increase in the unemployment rate.' 5 This is a substantial effect,"' which
indicates that card check regimes have the capacity to significantly alter
the workforce by encouraging the exclusion of some in order to provide
economic benefits for workers who remain employed.
3. Projected Empirical Results for the United States
Layne-Farrar used the Canadian results to evaluate how much the
U.S. unemployment rate would rise with the passage of EFCA. She ini-
tially assesses how much union density can be reasonably expected to rise
in response to an embrace by the federal government of a new card check
and compulsory arbitration regime. Sheldon Friedman, research coordina-
tor for the AFL-CIO, has stated that "EFCA 'could spur an increase in
U.S. union density of nearly five percentage points and perhaps much
169. Id. at 16.
170. A card check system enables workers to simply sign a card expressing a prefer-
ence for a union. Id. at 2. If a majority of workers do so, the union becomes the
representative of the workers in the bargaining unit. Id.
171. Id. at 16-17.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id. at 21.
175. See id. at 22.
176. Id. at 23.
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more.'"" Andy Stern, president of the SEIU, "estimates that the passage
of EFCA will increase union membership by 1.5 million each year for the
next 10-15 years.""' In response to these estimates, Layne-Farrar forecasts
that if card checks and a mandatory contract arbitration system were to
increase union density by five percentage points, the U.S. unemployment
rate would rise during the following year by 1.49 to 1.77% points over
current levels, which amounts to an increase of 2.38 to 2.71 million un-
employed workers."' If the passage of EFCA were to increase union
membership by 1.5 million each year for the next ten years, then unem-
ployment is predicted to rise by between 5.3 million and 6.2 million
people,'" meaning that Black unemployment would likely rise by almost
one million workers.'"' As one might expect, in addition to an increase in
the unemployment rate, the overall employment rate for the nation as
well as overall industry output would fall.'- Taken together, along with
the fact that Blacks are often the most vulnerable population during peri-
ods of rising economic dislocation, these developments are likely to
exacerbate African American unemployment and poverty rates.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING EFCA: A CRITICAL RACE REFORMIST VIEW
A. Prolegomiena
Supported by commentators and doubtlessly fueled by union cam-
paign contributions,' 3  card-check initiatives have recently become
177. Id. (internal citation omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id. at 24.
181. As of May 2009, the unemployment rate for Black workers in the U.S. was
almost fifteen percent. See Table supra, note 6. Fifteen percent multiplied by the overall
expected unemployment level of 6.2 million equals 930,000 Blacks who will be added to
the ranks of the unemployed. See id.
182. Layne-Farrar, supra note 125, at 24-26.
183. Labor unions receive vast sums of money. According to the U.S. Department
of Labor, labor unions receive upward of $17 billion a year in revenues. See LINDA
CHAVEZ & DANIEL GRAY, BETRAYAL: How UNION BOSSES SHAKE DOWN THEIR MEMBERS
AND CORRUPT AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (2004). Technically speaking, unions report that
they spend no money on politics because political contributions would be taxable. Id. at
13. But the lack of transparency in union spending allows for the possibility that labor
union political spending is very substantial. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note
144, at 1316-17. Several reports suggest a possible pattern of under-reporting of direct
and indirect union political expenditures. See, e.g., Beck Rights 2001: Are Workers Being
Heard?: Hearing Before the Subconnt. On Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Education
and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 29-35 (2002) (statement of Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.,
Vice President & Staff Attorney, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,
Inc.) (suggesting that union political action committees and issue advocacy amount to
between $300 million and $500 million in a presidential election year).
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politically viable. Plainly, the selection of the workers' exclusive bargaining
representative through an uncontested card check procedure, rather than a
contested secret ballot election, is appealing to labor leaders. If a union
can traverse the card check process successfully, it will obtain a new and
potentially rich source of union dues, which can yield political influence
and economic and ideological benefits to leaders and their allies.' Elec-
tions, on the other hand, carry the risk that the union organizing effort
will fail because workers are called upon to make open-minded decisions
about union membership, which requires evaluating both the advantages
and disadvantages. EFCA is an attempt on the part of labor organizations
to increase their strength through the application of governmental power,
rather than relying on workers' informed choice.
The principal purpose animating attempts to increase union power
and influence has escaped sustained attention. Labor unions seek to ac-
quire dues not only to provide benefits for some workers, but also to fuel
union efforts to achieve something far greater-societal transformation.' "
Societal transformation materializes in the form of the ever-expanding
state. This transformation from limited to expansive government produces
direct and collateral effects that fail to supply uniform benefits for all
members of the polity. After all, the "consequences in modern democra-
cies of the erosion of civil society by an expansionist state has everywhere
been the outbreak of a political war of redistribution."''1 This redistributive
war habitually favors hierarchy and seldom favors the marginalized. "7
"From being an umpire [that] enforces the rules of the game of civil asso-
ciation, the state has become the most potent weapon in an incessant
political conflict for resources."""
Consider the example of President Roosevelt. Though the drafters
of the Constitution sought to entrench precautions such as the doctrine
of federalism in order to constrain governmental power, President Roose-
velt became frustrated by such precautions. For instance, New Deal
reformers, including FDR, quickly scrapped their earlier states' right
views in favor of federal regulation of the labor market.'" They predicated
this move on the view that progressive social progress "equated active
government with good government.'" ' Accordingly, the Progressive the-
184. Hutchison, A Cleariin. in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1380-81 (showing unions
tend to consume up to eighty percent of union dues on indirect political, ideological, and
other purposes unrelated to collective bargaining and representation).
185. Id. at 1380.
186. GRAY, supra note 15, at 12.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WAStH-
INGTON 94 (1995).
190. RICIIARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROrE THE CONSTrUITION 7
(2006).
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ory of government generated a compatible constitutional theory that
eviscerated any constitutional doctrine that stood in the way of compre-
hensive reform."' Unswerving from the organizing premises of the New
Deal and the newly-ascendant zeitgeist favoring centralized power, FDI.
sought to avoid constitutional constraints on his powers by threatening to
change the constitutional order to suit his preferences by packing the Su-
preme Court.'"" During the New Deal, "[the] question of whether the
constitutional order should be altered to give [FDR's Progressives] ple-
nary regulatory power over the economy" despite strong public
opposition was "one of almost immeasurable importance. If political elites
could go against majority opinion on such a fundamental and far-
reaching question, it is hard to conceive of a situation, whether in normal
politics or otherwise, where they would be substantially less constrained
than this.""" Once the encroaching power of the state is unleashed, it is
doubtful that progressives can discover a principled stopping point with
regards to the state's power to create pro-union entities such as labor car-
tels.
History is rife with examples of political maneuvers favoring the
powerful. Jim Crow legislation in the South and the federal government's
failure to enact and enforce anti-lynching laws is one.' 4 Today progressive
values that subordinate authentic individuality and diversity to the tyranny
of collectivism epitomize such moves.' s While contemporary labor union
proponents issue poignant calls to breathe life into New Deal Progressiv-
ism premised on the need to attain equality, as well as economic and
social justice,'"" progressivism accompanied by government coercion may
provide the opposite. Because Americans, by and large, are not committed
to the principles of collectivism and because the interests of unionists are
frequently antagonistic to those of workers," government must, at times,
enforce pro-union efforts without strong popular support. This is possible
191. Id.
192. See Ilya Sonin, Voter Knoilcdge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New,
Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 660 (2003) (discussing FDR's attempt to
pack the Supreme Court).
193. Id. at 628.
194. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 255 (describing President Wilson's
modern racism that gave rise to the resegregation of the federal government, support for
anti-miscegenation laws and opposition to anti-lynching laws).
195. See, e.g., Dannin, supra note 114, at 274 (asserting the view that "[the war is
between those who support collective values and well-being for all and those who sup-
port unbridled individualism; between those who value workplace and social democracy
and those who pronote workplace and governmental totalitarianism."). Professor Dan-
nin's analysis shows that today's progressives remain captive to the mores of the
Progressive Era. See id.
196. See Dannin, supra note 114, at 274.
197. See, e.g., W. H. HuTr, THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 1930-1975
8-9 (2d ed. 1975) (1930).
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because liberalism, the customary governance theory in democratic socie-
ties,"' provides two related possibilities: authoritarianism and capture by
powerful factions."" Once an organization captures power, it can be de-
ployed by hierarchs in order to control society. Accordingly, as soon as the
levers of power are seized, political and ideological elites often force the
government to take sides and impose their wi1l.''" This approach placates
narrow, well organized interest groups and places policymaking into the
hands of an autonomous progressive elite.
2
1
Trade unions, as well as other largely autonomous institutions that
populate the West, have an incentive to give up their independence to
become tools of political advantage for various interests. 202 Mounting
evidence indicates that the mission of the modern state is "to satisfy the
private preferences of collusive interest groups.' 2"3 Insofar as it is possible
to achieve private aims and objectives through government processes
more efficiently than by relying on market processes,"" many groups and
oligarchs have an incentive to capture government to attain private gain
at the expense of the marginalized. American unions are one of these
types of groups. This is evidenced by the fact that they spend only a
small amount of their dues revenues on collective bargaining and related
activities, while expenditures for political and related purposes
continue to rise on a per member basis."'1 Rising union political
expenditures 2" supports the contention that government intervention
198. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Inherent Authoritarianism in Democratic Regimes,
in OUT o: AND INTO AUTHORITARIAN LAW 125-149 (Andras Sajo ed., 2002) ("Authori-.
tarianism is an inherent structural tendency of democratic regimes.").
199. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1339-42 (discussing cap-
ture).
200. See Hutchison, Liberty, Liberalism and Neutrality, supra note 141, at 810.
201. Somin, supra note 192, at 657-58 (discussing the Roosevelt Administration's
push to enact the NLRA in spite of the absence of strong public support). Woodrow
Wilson's "Big Man" thesis explains how this occurs: the leader's conception of the state as
an organic whole legitimates undemocratic action and unchecked power. See GOLDBERG,
supra note 10, at 86 (discussing Wilson's commitment to the "Big Man" thesis and his
support for the notion that government must conform to the Darwinian theory of organic
life).
202. GRAY, supra note 15, at 12.
203. Id. at 11-12. This is so "whether or not the pursuit of such aims is cloaked in
language implying some pure public purpose or alternatively infused with the language of
market failure." Hutchison, Liberty, Liberalism, and Neutrality, supra note 141, at 825 (in-
ternal citation omitted).
204. WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: MARKETS,
WELFARE AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY 109 (1994).
205. Harry G. Hutchison, The Market for Union Representation: An Infornation Deficit or
Rational Behavior, 94 VA. L. REV. 15, 16 (2008).
206. Hutchison, Compulsory Unionist,, as a Fraternal Conceit?, supra note 37, at 126-27
(citing evidence of the continued growth in total receipts by several major unions that
make up the AFL-CIO while membership levels have declined).
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on behalf of labor provides disproportionate benefits to members of the
labor union hierarchy and their political and ideological allies, fewer
benefits to members of the rank and file, and nothing but bitter experi-
ence to workers displaced by enforced unionism..
2
11
7
Because African Americans and members of other marginalized
groups make up a disproportionate share of the latter category, -'" and be-
cause Critical Race Reformists challenge the social vision that reinforces
and contributes to the enervation of people of color, it is time for the
concerns of outsiders to take center stage when the nation considers new
labor market legislation. The suppression of marginalized individuals and
groups is the most recent in a line of Progressive Era paradoxes. For ex-
ample, contemporary evidence shows that Congress enacted the Fair
Labor Standards Act during the New Deal purportedly as a vehicle to
advance the interest of marginalized workers.2 "' However, it currently dis-
favors the poor by increasing the number and percentage of unemployed
workers coming from lower-class families, while disproportionately sup-
plying benefits in the form of higher wages to young people living in
middle-to-upper-class families.' This inversion emphasizes the continu-
ing effect of exclusionary labor policies.
2 1 '
B. Race in the Mirror of Hierarchy
While proponents argue that EFCA makes it easier for employees to
obtain collective bargaining agreements by leveling the playing field be-
tween employees and employers and prevents stonewalling by managers,
as well as 2'- counteracting wage declines by ensuring fair wages and fair
207. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1339-42 (explaining how
labor unions produce benefits for the few in the name of the many and disputing the
claim that all members of the group benefit equally).
208. See, e.g., supra Part I. See also, DOUC.LAss NORTH & ROGER MILLER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 125 (1983) (noting that when the minimum wage was increased
by 33.3%, non-White teenage unemployment increased from 13% to more than 24%);
Donald Deere et al., Sense and Nonsense on the Minimum Wage, I REGULATION 47, 51
(1995) (showing African Anserican teenagers were disproportionately unemployed as a
result of rise in the minimum wage).
209. Hutchison, Toward A Critical Race Reformist Conception of Mininui Wage Regimes,
supra note 51, at 104-06.
210. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR., &
GILLIAN L. L. LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 577 (4th ed. 2007)
(showing that although the ninimum wage continues to enjoy wide-spread support, only
seventeen percent of low-wage workers in the United States were living in poor house-
holds in 2003, and thus, the people who are generally favored by this type of intervention
in the market are not poor).
211. See itfra Part IV.B.1.
212. See 155 CONG. REC. E620 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Stark).
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benefits, 2 3 it is important to note that labor unions and their ideological
allies-rather than workers-are the most committed supporters of this
proposal. An examination of America's labor history reveals the true moti-
vation behind this advocacy.
1. America's Labor History
It is clear that "the original progressive architects, and some New
Deal renovators, were partisans of human inequality. For example, the
labor legislation they pioneered was designed to exclude immigrants,
women and African Americans."2 " Additionally, progressives were
enthusiastic "biologizers." 2  Biologizers believed that biology-i.e. race-
determined human worth. "American labor reformers judged an
impressive array of human groups-male Anglo-Saxon heads of house-
hold excepted-to be unworthy of work, or 'unemployable.' "26" These
reformers premised their judgements, at least in part, on the claim that
low-wage races were hereditarily predisposed to low standards of living,"
7
which, accordingly, placed superior races at risk.-" American labor law
largely commenced during President Hoover's administration with the
passage of the Davis-Bacon Act, followed by President Roosevelt's
creation of the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Brimming
with claims that it would advance social justice, the NRA in fact led to
bureaucratic managerialism, a quasi-scientific process in which govern-
ment regulated the terms of employment as well as the conditions under
which labor unions materialized. Supporters justified this structure by
contending that government possessed resources that rank and file citizens
and workers lacked.2 ' Enforced by threats and violence, this program
granted new collective bargaining powers to unions, including the power
to lock Blacks out of the labor force.2" Despite criticism from members
of the Black press, labor unions were delighted to take advantage of this
new found power.' 2'
213. See 155 CONG. REC. S2967 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy).
214. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 177.
215. Id. at 179.
216. Id. at 180.
217. Id. at 180-81 n.7.
218. See id. at 181.
219. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AiFrER VIRTUE 85 (2nd ed. 1984) (suggesting that as
the government accepts that it can manipulate human action, it becomes a hierarchy of
bureaucratic managers and explaining that the major justification advanced for the inter-
vention of government in society is that government has resources of competence, which
most citizens do not possess).
220. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 155-56.
221. See id. at 156.
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The NRA, an institutional outgrowth of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA),2 22 was only one of many pro-union programs im-
plemented during the Hoover and R oosevelt administrations. These
programs, which essentially created labor cartels, prolonged and worsened
the Great Depression. 2 Wrongly blaming high unemployment levels on
low wages and low prices, the government engaged in a disastrous effort
to raise wages and prices. 2-4 It is difficult to ignore the evidence that sev-
eral years' worth of sustained government planning merely created a
depression within a Depression.2- As such, NIRA, the flagship program of
the New Deal, was a mammoth public policy failure.2 2" FDP's attempt to
supply centrally-planned price controls and production limits caused a
"massive six to eleven percent decline in the United States' Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP) in an already depressed economy."-'- While unions
thrive when the government invades the marketplace through bureau-
cratic laws and regulation ,221 this invasion imposes costs on the overall
economy and disproportionately disfavors members of marginalized
groups. As previously noted, even staunch labor union defender Professor
Richard Freeman acknowledges that "unions raise wages in ways that
misallocate labor and reduce social output."2" ' Consistent with these ob-
servations, "[t]o the extent that unions are successful, they redistribute
income toward their members, who are predominantly White, male and
well paid, at the expense of consumers as a whole, taxpayers, non-union
workers, the poor, and the unemployed.
-2 3
o
This disheartening picture comes into sharper focus when consider-
ing members of minority groups. The American labor movement is
inescapably linked to intentional racist oppression.2 1 While this problem is
not unique to the United States, the American labor movement notably
222. Act of Jun. 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C.
703).
223. See VEDDER & GALLAWAY, supra note 6, at 130-43.
224. See, e.g., id. at 112-13, 130-43 (noting that rapidly rising money wages tied to
banking policies and New Deal wage-raising legislation represented a continuation of the
high-wage policy initiated by Hoover and further developed by Roosevelt).
225. SHLAES, supra note 107, at 2-3.
226. Somin, supra note 192, at 650. This is in spite of the fact that it gave both big
business and labor union leaders the opportunity to implement cartelization schemes for
product prices and labor markets. Id. at 651.
227. Id.
228. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 5, at 826.
229. Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?
ill UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 144 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B.
Voos eds., 1992).
230. MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COSTS OF LABOR LAW
29 (1987).
231. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimnun, Wage Regimes,
supra note 51, at 118-29.
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engaged in an often brutal campaign of racial exclusion from the found-
ing of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the nineteenth century
to the Great Depression and subsequent periods. 212 For the purposes of
self advancement, labor unions historically strongly supported legislation
enhancing their power to exclude. 2" Taking advantage of the monopoly
power granted by the NIRA, trade unions displaced disfavored workers
and reified economic and social stratification. NIRA codified wage differ-
entials in such a way that even when a Black employee performed more
important tasks than a White employee, he would frequently have a lower
job classification and hence a lower wage than his White counterpart.
2 34
According to one estimate, NIRA's minimum wage provisions destroyed
the jobs of half a million Blacks.
23
3
Building on this grim record, the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act,
(FLSA) led to results comparable to the disastrous policies in Apartheid-
era South Africa. 23" According to the U.S. Labor Department, enforcement
of FLSA's minimun wage provisions caused between 30,000 and 50,000
workers, mostly southern Blacks, to lose their jobs within two weeks.21
7
Evidence shows that the architects of both NIRA and the FLSA knew
the laws would create disproportionate unemployment among southern
African Americans.2 31 "[M]ost advocates of these laws saw the resulting
unemployment, at worst, as an unfortunate necessity, and in many cases as
a positive feature. "-
3
9
Given that minimum wage laws reduce the cost of discrimination to
employers,'2 41 and that the government enforced NIRA in blatantly
discriminatory ways, it is probable that racial animus motivated some of
the supporters of wage minimums and other New Deal initiatives. Even if
232. See, e.g., id. at 118-26 (documenting labor union participation in the creation
of outsiders in America).
233. For example, Congress enacted NIRA, with significant labor union support. Id.
at 123. See also id. at 118-26 (showing union support for legislation and policies that en-
hanced their ability to exclude).
234. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass', supra note 35, at 120-21.
235. David T. Beito, Review of Only One Place of Redress, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV.
293, 296 (2001).
236. Hutchison, Tow'ard a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Mininini Wae Reines,
supra note 51, at 126-28. See also, SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 65, at 215-19
(explaining the disaster minimum wages continue to work on Blacks in Africa and how
South Africa's increase in minimum wages has contributed to a rise in employment in
largely non-Black Poland).
237. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass', supra note 35, at 130 (quoting William A.
Keyes, The Minimtumn Wage and the Davis-Beacon Act: Einploymient Effects oil Minorities and
Youth, 3J. LAB. lris. 399, 401 (1982)).
238. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 178.
239. Id.
240. SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 65, at 201.
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this is not true, the FLSA, along with other New Deal legislation,24 ' con-
tributed to a persistent increase in African American unemployment. This
is because democratic governments tend to give the greatest benefits to
those who are the best organized and have the most influence--
categories that include few Blacks. Such results are consistent with the
thesis that labor unions benefit the few and subjugate the many by pro-
tecting "superior" races from competition with "inferior" ones. An early
architect of the Progressive Era, prominent labor economist John R.
Commons, supplied legitimacy to this thesis by suggesting that race, not
productivity, determined living standards and that, accordingly, Whites saw
African Americans as "indolent and fickle," a view that allowed them to
defend slavery as necessary.243 Far from being a countermajoritarian force
for inclusive social change, labor union minimum wage advocacy in the
United States, like in Apartheid-era South Africa, spread an ideology that
depicts Blacks and other minorities as inferior outsiders.' "4
The South African experience illustrates that one of the most effec-
tive vehicles for excluding non-Whites are statutes or industrial
agreements that impose minimum wages.2-4  This type of market interfer-
ence, whether motivated by racist rhetoric or not, is particularly attractive
to those who are offended when an employer employs Blacks instead of
Whites.2 16 Accordingly, it is not a surprise that
[d]epression-era legislation, though officially colorblind, was
often highly discriminatory A case in point was the Davis-
Bacon Act, which required construction firms with federal
contracts to pay "prevailing wages." As defined by the Depart-
ment of Labor, the prevailing wage usually equaled the union
wage, thus freezing low-skilled Black workers out of many
projects. 2"7
241. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
LABOR REGULATIONS, & THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 103
(2001) [hereinafter, BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS] (showing that the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Acts reimbursed White planters for taking land out of production,
causing many owners to evict African American tenant farmers from their land).
242. Id.
243. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 181.
244. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes,
supra note 51, at 130.
245. Id. at 131.
246. Id.
247. Beito, supra note 235, at 296.
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Passed during the Hoover administration, "' and impelled, in part, by
the same logic that encouraged the pre-Mandela South African govern-
ment to adopt policies favoring Whites at the expense of Black workers,
the same progressive forces that later gave rise to NIRA and the NLRA
catalyzed the Davis-Bacon Act. While some supporters of progressive re-
form justified labor initiatives on ground that protecting "deserving"
workers necessitated the exclusion of "unfit" workers from the workplace,
many backers of the Davis-Bacon Act saw no need to "hide their racist
goals. At the hearings for the bill, William Green, the president of the
American Federation of Labor, in his testimony praised the proposed law
because it would make it more difficult for contractors to 'demoralize'
wage rates through use of low-wage colored labor."'"
Proceeding along a pathway blazed by White South African craft
unionists who demanded the segregation of Blacks and their total exclu-
sion from industrial work,2"( American labor unions assumed control of
exclusionary efforts in the United States. At times, such efforts were
grounded in the ideology of White supremacy. At other times, the eco-
nomic consequences of exclusion drove union efforts. Evidence of the
former tendency can be found in connection with NIRA:
Seeking to avail itself of the powers granted under Section 7A
of the [NIRA], union labor strategy seems to be to form a un-
ion in a given plant, strike to obtain the right to bargain with
the employer as the sole representative of labor and then the
close the union to black workers, effectively cutting them off
from employment. 2 '
After the Supreme Court invalidated NIRA, Congress passed the NLRkA,
which permanently enshrined many of NIRA's exclusionary features." 2
Premised on progressive themes, supporters of the NLRA advanced it as
an affirmative vehicle for social and economic progress that would pro-
vide freedom and dignity for workers.253 Still, the NLRA "significantly
expanded the closed union shop, which, as future NAACP head Roy
Wilkins stated, was all too often a White union shop."2- Nevertheless,
248. See Walter Williams, Congress' Insidious Discrimination, JEWISH WORLD REVIEW,
Mar. 12, 2003, available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/willianis031203.asp
(accessed Jun. 6, 2009) (showing that the Davis-Bacon Act was designed to reduce em-
ployment competition from Black laborers and favor White laborers).
249. Beito, supra note 235, at 296.
250. WALTER E. WILLIAMS, SOUTH AFRICA'S WAR AGAINST CAPITALISM 49 (1989).
251. Beito, supra note 235, at 297.
252. SOMIN, supra note 192, at 657-58 (discussing the Roosevelt Administration's
push to enact the NLIA in spite of the absence of strong public support).
253. TIHE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28 (John E. Higgins et al. eds., 2006).
254. Beito, supra note 235, at 297.
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New Deal exclusion continued into the 19 40s and labor union subordi-
nation continued at least through the 1980s.255
Many portray federal interventionism during the New Deal as part
of an encouraging pursuit of social equality that set the stage for later civil
rights measures.2" However, as discussed, the record shows that the pur-
ported search for social equality during the 1930s operated consistently
with the paradoxes embedded in progressivism, resulting in government
behavior that produced more inequality. The New Deal government's
underlying attitude favoring supremacists is highlighted by noting that the
"Roosevelt administration expressed little interest in civil rights during
the 1930s and seemed even less concerned than previous administrations
about the need for anti-lynching legislation."2 7
Though it is clear that facts drawn from the 1930s are direct evi-
dence of an intimate connection between racially supremacist intent and
labor legislation, some observers may surrender to the claim that Progres-
sive Era labor initiatives can be explained in benign terms that excuse its
racially-charged consequences. But even assuming a benign original pur-
pose, African Americans and other oppressed populations should be
forgiven for suspecting more invidious forces at work. Far from delivering
social justice, the implementation of the "common good" during the
New Deal led to instances of flagrant injustice.2 " New Deal programs
strengthened American labor unions' commitment to the norms of sepa-
ration and White supremacy. -" This fact makes it impossible to take
seriously claims that the New Deal and the labor movement participated
in a benign program that was occasionally hijacked by bad actors. For ex-
ample, the Railway Brotherhood, armed with the Railway Labor Act,
regularly organized strikes aimed at forcing employers to pursue Whites-
only hiring policies.2'1 Other railroad unions persuaded legislatures to pass
"full crew" laws.2 "' Though these laws purported to improve safety, the
unions insisted that state railroad officials apply them by disallowing Black
porters to do trainmen's work, which eventually led to their displacement
by White workers. 2" Railroad unions were not alone in supporting segre-
gationist and White supremacist policies. Many unions, often functioning
as lodges or private clubs, adhered to a pernicious racial hierarchy to
255. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes,
supra note 51, at 125.
256. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS, supra note 241, at 106 (disputing
this view).
257. Beito, supra note 235, at 298.
258. Hutchison, Work, The Social Question, supra note 32, at 104.
259. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Minimnum Wage Regimes,
supra note 77, at 120.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. By 1939 these laws were operative in twenty-four states. Id. at 120-121.
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further their social and economic goals.2"3 Progressive labor law, by carv-
ing the labor market into cartels, furthered unions' exclusionary
objectives. Just like the pattern that emerged during South Africa's exclu-
sionary epoch, many White union members' loyalty to their unions
transcended "narrow pecuniary self-interest."2"' 4 The coercive force of
New Deal labor law strengthened White members who wanted to ex-
clude Blacks from their unions because they believed that their own social
status would decline if they associated with Blacks.
2'
Historically, exclusionary practices in the United States prevailed
where unions controlled access to work.-" Although the Supreme Court
softened the force of labor union exclusion by imposing a duty of fair
representation on labor unions, the Justices declined to require the union
to admit African Americans despite the union's status as an exclusive bar-
gaining agent. -2 67 In more recent cases, all-White or largely White labor
unions claimed that a policy that excluded workers not related to current
members by blood or marriage was nondiscrimatory."" Ominously, dis-
criminatory effects do not always depend on evidence of prejudice. For
instance, Thomas Sowell shows Black artisans were more prevalent in the
American South-where more prejudice but less discrimination existed-
than in the North, where labor unions controlled.2 -, This observation at-
tests to the capacious power of the labor unions to exclude.
Instances where governmental labor programs opted not to exclude
Blacks from employment were even more deplorable. During the 1940s
the United States Employment Service, a federal agency, enticed hundreds
of young African American men with offers of "free" travel from cities
across the South to enjoy Florida sunshine and work in the sugar fields
during World War 11.2" Instead of enjoying sunshine, warm weather, and
free travel, they ended up paying at least a week's worth of wages for their
transportation and were then shunted to labor camps replete with guards
who killed men for asking for their wages or for trying to leave.-"' Facing
263. Id. at 121.
264. Richard McAdais, Cooperation and Conflict: The Econonics of Group Status Pro-
dnction and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1084 (1995) (footnote omitted).
265. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass', supra note 35, at 95.
266. See Michael J. Goldberg, Affirnative Action in Union Government: The Landn,n-
Grffin Act Inplications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 652 n. 26 (1983) [hereinafter, Michael Gold-
berg]. See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
267. Steele, 323 U.S. at 199 (1944) (the Court accepts that African Americans "are not
members of the Brotherhood or eligible for membership").
268. See, e.g., Local 53 of the Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers
v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1969).
269. See THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICiES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
31 (1990).
270. RIISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LosT PROMISE o CIVIL IGITs 1 (2007). See also
Hutchison, Work, The Social Qnestion, supra note 32, at 103-104.
271. GOLUBOFF, supra note 271, at 2.
[VOL. 15:369
Employee Free Choice
long days of brutal work pervaded by fear and punctuated by violence,
these workers determined that escape was the only option.' - At the same
time, despite the abortive commitment of most modern liberal states since
the French Revolution to end slavery, " Roosevelt's Justice Department
ignored requests to stop the "virtual slavery" in Florida's sugar camps.'7
Far from being an isolated instance of government complicity in subordi-
nation, the United States Employment Service, which acted as a liaison
between hiring employers and would-be workers, accommodated racial
discrimination. 2  This oppressive history continued virtually unabated
into the 1950s and 1960s.-16 In the late 1950s, this record prompted A.
Phillip Randolph, the only Black member of the twenty-seven member
executive council of the AFL-CIO, to complain.2" AFL-CIO President
George Meany ridiculed him: "Who the hell appointed you as the guard-
ian of all the Negroes in America?"' -x
Exclusion of Blacks and dominance by Whites continued to infect
the labor union movement into the 1970s and 19 80s, prompting one ob-
server to conclude that the "history of race ... discrimination has left its
mark on the present composition of the [entire] labor movement, particu-
larly on the limited number of minorities ... who hold leadership
positions in unions." -75 The Emporium Capwell case is part of this dismal
record of labor relations that originated during the onset of the Progres-
sive Era. In this case, the Supreme Court permitted the discharge of Black
workers who had engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of nego-
tiating with their employer over discriminatory working conditions. -"
The Court permitted discharge because it saw the employees' conduct as
inimical to the fundamental purpose of the NLRA."' This granted the
labor union complete power to negotiate such issues as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative.282
Despite the superficial trope of official neutrality, the move to cartel-
ize labor through centralized government reflects an incandescent
272. Id.
273. ANDRESS, supra note 13, at 1.
274. GOLUBOFF, supra note 271, at 2.
275. Id. at 3, 85-86.
276. Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Minimum Wage Regilpes,
supra note 51, at 124.
277. Id.
278. FOBERT H. ZEIGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS 174 (Stanley 1.
Kutler ed., 2nd ed. 1994).
279. Michael Goldberg, supra note 266, at 653.
280. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 71 (1975).
See also, COMM. ON THE DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER -THE NAT'L LABOR PRELATIONs ACT,
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 87 (John
E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
281. See Emporiunm Capwell, 420 U.S. at 70-73
282. Id.
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commitment to the norms of White supremacy and indifference, if not
enmity, toward African Americans. "Few of the Progressives who domi-
nated left-wing politics before the New Deal evinced sympathy for civil
rights, and many were hostile to African Americans. Indeed, many of the
same regulatory impulses that inspired the New Deal motivated support-
ers of segregation laws earlier in the century""' Moreover, "the most
statist post-bellum presidential administration before FDR's, Woodrow
Wilson's [administration] was extremely hostile to African Americans.The
Hoover administration, dominated by Progressive Republicans, including
Hoover himself, also treated African Americans poorly."284 Responding to
bipartisan enthusiasm for progressive values and the exclusionary conse-
quences of the New Deal in 1936, T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban
League wrote that "'[i]f the present trend continues, there is slight ques-
tion that the Negro will be gradually forced into a condition of economic
peonage, every bit as devastating as plantation slavery ever was.' ""' This
perspective corroborates the contention that New Deal government
regulation harmed African Americans."'
One can accept assertions that Franklin Roosevelt's policies success-
fully reduced inequality during and subsequent to the New Deal '7 only
by ignoring the substantial suffering, widespread unemployment and the
plight of African Americans and others, whose present and future pros-
pects were diminished by progressive policies. The ghosts of the
Progressive Era continue to disenfranchise African American workers:
283. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS, supra note 241, at 106.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 107.
286. Id. at 1-7 (contending that African Americans would have fared better if courts
had invalidated such legislation using Lochnerian principles). To be sure, contrasting per-
spectives are available. For instance Professor Kropp asserts that Bernstein falls prey to a
"false dichotomy: the choice was not necessarily between having no governmental regula-
tion and having harmful governmental regulation." See, e.i., Steven H. Kropp,
Deconstiictin,, Racism in Anericau Society-The Role Labor Law Miqllt Have Played (But Did
NTot) hi Endi#ii Race Discrimtiuatio: A Partial Explanation and Historical Comincntary, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 371 (2002). Instead, Kropp argues, "the courts might
have construed the New Deal labor legislation in such a way that advanced the interests
of African Americans." Id. Kropp's analysis is unconvincing for two reasons. First, "[w]hat
might have been is an abstraction remaining a perpetual possibility only in a world of
speculation." T. S. ELLIOT, Burnt Norton, in FOUR QUARTETS 13, 13 (Harvest/HBJ Book
1971) (1943), available at http://www.artofeurope.com/eliot/eli5.htm. Kropp's critique
fails to adequately deal with the probability that judges, as leading members of the privi-
leged elite, were influenced by eugenics. Hence, their failure to rescue Blacks from labor
oppression was unfortunate but foreseeable. Second, it is doubtful that the government
could have fashioned any regulation beneficial to Blacks during the 1930s, as long as
members of the Roosevelt administration and judges nominated by FDIk maintained
Progressive Era myths premised on innate racial differences.
287. Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 6, at 62, reprinted in
EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, BEYOND RATIONAL CHOICE: ALTERNA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS 397 (2005).
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[The] relevant repercussions of Progressive Era ideas have es-
caped the light of scrutiny. The architects of the New, the Fair
Deal, and the Great Society all inherited and built upon the
progressive welfare state. And they did this in explicit terms,
citing such prominent race builders as Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson as their inspirations. Obviously, the de-
liberate racist intent in many of these polices was not shared by
subsequent generations of liberals. But that didn't erase the ra-
cial content of the policies themselves. The Davis-Bacon Act
still hurts low-wage Blacks, for example. FDR's labor and agri-
cultural policies threw millions of Blacks out of work and off
their land.The great migration of African Americans to north-
ern cities was in no small part a result of the success of
progressive policies [that threw them out of unions and jobs in
the South]. Black leaders didn't call the National Recovery
Administration, or NRA, the 'Negro Run Around' for noth-
Ing."
If the welfare of African Americans is factored into America's economic
calculus, defenses of the New Deal are irremediably incoherent.
Insofar as labor union oligarchy may now be considered the norm,211
policies that America's current labor leadership and their contemporary
ideological allies support fail to fully reflect the interest of a majority of
the represented workforce. Given this configuration, it is doubtful that the
interest of African Americans and other minorities can successfully cap-
ture the focus of America's entrenched, autocratic, and possibly corrupt
labor leadership." ' The fact that unions exclude minorities from union
leadership positions bolsters doubt and gives credence to the argument
that unions cannot fully represent their minority members.2" Rather than
delivering freedom and justice for all, labor unions, augmented by the
coercive power of the state, are persistent and effective vehicles of racial
oppression. This gives rise to a forecast: when and if the government de-
ploys power on behalf of unions in the future, oppression and exclusion,
whether deliberate or inadvertent, will likely follow.
288. GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM, supra note 10, at 268-69.
289. Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Con-
trol, 1992 U. ILL. L. ,EV. 367, 371. See also, Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargainingq,
93 YALE L.J. 793, 843 (1984).
290. Schwab, supra note 289, at 368 ("Even staunch union supporters blanche over
the autocracy, entrenchment, and corruption of some union leaders.").
291. Michael Goldberg, supra note 267, at 653.
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2. EFCA: Extending Hierarchy?
While I have not uncovered any direct evidence showing that pro-
ponents defend EFCA on the basis of racial superiority, it is doubtful that
EFCA can be completely separated from the rest of existing labor law.
The previous section of this Article argues that the current labor law sys-
tem is rooted in racism. At the outset, the objective of this transformative
process depended heavily upon notions of racial superiority. Today, the
focus on societal transformation, collective insurgency, and class-based
justice led by union oligarchs provides space that enables society to ignore
the elephant in the room: the persistent and widening racial gap in un-
employment 2' 2 and the labor movement's prominent role in this
development.
Evidence shows that American labor law inhibits job opportunities
for African American workers, while improving the social and economic
status of Whites. For example, the duty of fair representation, imposed
after the passage of the New Deal labor legislation, was designed to ensure
fair treatment of all union members by union leaders, particularly African
American union workers."-3 However, when the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a union has a duty to represent all workers covered by a
collective bargaining agreement fairly, it ruled that unions need not admit
African American members."' New Deal legislation signaled that the fed-
eral government decided to take sides in the political war that afflicts most
modern liberal democracies, favoring labor union hierarchy and disfavor-
ing the marginalized. With this pivotal maneuver, the government,
deliberately or inadvertently, excluded African American workers under
the guise of progress and social justice for all. These developments, taken
together, give rise to a paramount question: Can new labor law initiatives,
such as EFCA, that are shaped by the New Deal's exclusionary premises,
escape either the union movement's or the Progressive Era's record of di-
minishing equality?
The answer lies in the fact that EFCA is the most dramatic altera-
tion in labor laws since 1935 and the Progressive Era.2'- While that alone
does not prove discriminatory intent, Richard Epstein shows that EFCA
will likely retard the formation of small businesses, increase the likelihood
of multiple union arbitrations covering different locations, send jobs off-
shore, and increase industrial strife, in addition to subjecting workers to
union intimidation..2 ' SimilarlyJudge Richard Posner asserts that if EFCA
292. BELL, supra note 68, at 735-38.
293. Id. at 753.
294. Id. at 753-54.
295. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 1, at
1.
296. Id. at 6-7.
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is enacted, it will reduce efficiency by increasing employers' labor costs,
which will raise unemployment. 27 Marginalized Americans are unlikely
to benefit from these developments.
On the other hand, one of the principal sponsors of EFCA, the late
Senator Kennedy, insisted that EFCA will equip workers with the "free-
dom to choose a union without fear of threats or intimidation"-2'? and
assist labor organizations in their efforts to "provide greater security and
greater promise of fair treatment."2 "" Kennedy failed to supply plausible
evidence verifying the truthfulness of his claims and makes no attempt to
show how EFCA will benefit African Americans and other outsiders in
the face of labor law's tendency to increase unemployment for America's
most vulnerable populations.""'
Other legislators rebut Senator Kennedy's arguments about EFCA's
fairness. Representative Pitts states that the secret ballot is
a fundamental principle of American democracy. If individuals
want to join a union, they are entitled to that right. They can
show their support with their vote. But if workers do not want
to pay union dollars to be used to advance a political agenda
they disagree with, they should also be afforded the right to
cast their vote free of coercion and intimidation in a secret bal-
lot election."'
The EFCA's alternative to the secret ballot is the card check. It should be
noted that "[p]rofound doubts over a card check have been voiced by la-
bor's natural allies."3112 Recently, former Democratic senator and
presidential nominee George McGovern condemned EFCA because of
its failure to take into account the obvious: "There are many documented
cases where workers have been pressured, harassed, tricked and intimi-
dated into signing cards that have led to mandatory payment of dues.
'"3'
297. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 225 (2009).
298. 155 CONG. REC. S2967 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy).
299. See id.
300. His comments mirror the claims of his brother, then-Senator John Kennedy,
who supported minimurn wage laws as a way of protecting New England businesses from
southern-and largely African Anmerican-competition, thereby offsetting the South's
advantage in labor costs. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass," supra note 35, at 131 n.32 8 .
301. 155 CONG. R.EC. H3111 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of P.ep. Pitts).
302. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, slpra note 1, at
46.
303. George McGovern, My Party Should Respect Secret Union Ballots, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121815502467222555.htnl.
See also, Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and the
Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 347, 364-65
(1998) (describing how employees who take on union leaders find the process marked by
insults, coercion, and threats to life and family).
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EFCA's proponents continue to advance the card check on the basis
of dubious claims. For instance, many leading Democratic members of
Congress, "have advised workers in developing countries such as Mexico
to insist on the secret ballot when voting as to whether or not their
workplaces should have a union,' " 4 even while arguing to dispense with
this desirable protection for workers in the U.S.-" Similarly, while most
nonunion workers surveyed appear to reject unionization as a desirable
objective, defenders of EFCA claim that "more than half of all non-union
workers-nearly 60 million men and women-say they would join a un-
ion if they could. 3 1" Claiming that the current system is rigged against
workers because of employer hostility,1 7 Senator Kennedy ignored widely
available information showing that such contentions are inaccurate."
Defenders of EFCA in Congress, perhaps animated by the prospect
of future campaign contributions,3"' argue that employer pressure prevents
workers who want to join labor organizations from doing so. These same
politicians appear deaf to reports of union intimidation and coercion:-"
They also disregard substantial independent evidence confirming worker
indifference toward union representation and worker preferences favoring
either a company funded or jointly run organization. 31' Against this back-
ground, even leading union proponents concede that employer hostility
and unfair labor practices have little to no effect on a union's ability to
prevail in an election campaign under the NLRA. 31 2 In truth, the failure
304. EiSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST TIlE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 1, at
46 (quoting Sen. McGovern).
305. Id.
306. 155 Cong. Rec. S2967 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
307. See id.
308. See Hylton, supra note 124, at 695-97 (eviscerating the employer hostility the-
sis). See also Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 5, at 820-23.
309. Jill Lawrence, Democrats Ponder Labor Split's Political Effect, USA TODAY, Jul. 27,
2005, at 4A (showing'that labor unions occupy seven of the top ten spots on a recent list
of America's leading contributors to political parties).
310. See, e.g., Knollenberg, supra note 303, at 364-65 (describing evidence of union
coercion). See also, Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaimingq the First Amendment Througqh Union
Dues Restrictions, 10 U. PA. J. or Bus. AND EMiL. L. 663, 711-12 (2008) [hereinafter,
Hutchison, Reclaiminig the First Amendment].
311. Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report amid the Future of Labor Lau, Reform, 12
LAB. LAW 117, 118 n.2 (1996) (citing PRINCErON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY: RkEPORT ON THE FINDINCGS 49
(1994) ("By an overwhelming 86% to 9% margin, workers want an organization run
jointly by employers and management rather than an independent, employee-run organi-
zation. By a smaller, but still sizable margin of 52% to 34%, workers want an organization
to be staffed and funded by the company, rather than independently through employee
contributions.")).
312. Eugene Scalia, The Federalist Society Online Debate Series: The Employee
Free Choice Act (Jun. 1, 2009), http://vww.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.28,css.print/
default.asp (quoting Thomas Kochan and John-Paul Ferguson suggesting that unfair labor
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of union organizing efforts reflects emerging worker hostility to labor
unions. 3 More to the point, data shows that African American workers
have uncovered the incapacity of collective bargaining regimes to repre-
sent people of color, leading some to conclude that unions do not, and
cannot represent their interests." This evidence implies that the reason
unions do not support secret ballot elections is because they allow work-
ers to more freely reject unions."'
Professor Hayward, a leading commentator on the legitimacy of
various voting regimes, persuasively unmasks partisanship in an organizing
context. She shows that grievances-even legitimate grievances about the
fairness of union organizing elections employer labor practices-do not
justify discarding the secret ballot's protection from fraud and coercion."'
She states "that if an election is to serve the welfare of a large group, de-
serve respect, and keep the peace and order, voting procedures in such
contexts should insulate voters from outsider influence at the time of vot-
ing.""' 7 Under a card check system for selecting the workers' bargaining
representative, union representatives can put vulnerable workers in coer-
cive situations when asking them to sign cards in favor of union
representation. Furthermore, because card check efforts need not be pub-
licized, nor the identities of union supporters released, there is no way for
a worker whose name has been fraudulently added to the union's card
practices have no effect on election outcomes). See also John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of
the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Oranizingq Drives, 1999-2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 3, 17 (Oct. 2008).
313. Seymour Martin Lipset & Marcella Ridlen Ray, Technology, Work, and Social
Chang'e, 27 J. OF LAB. RES. 613, 617 (1996) (stating that Americans "perceive unions to be
overly involved in politics ... [and] more intent on fighting change than in helping to
bring it about").
314. Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selni, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1351 (1997).
315. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 5, at 815-17 (showing that workers
are likely to reject labor unions as a vehicle to voice their views). See also Hutchison,
Liberty, Liberalism and Neutrality, supra note 141, at 783. Taken as a whole, legislators'
persistent attempts to defend EFCA may show one of two things. If they are ignoring
contradictory information, they show hypocrisy. Id. Equally possible, if they willingly
screen themselves from information that contradicts their claims, they show that they are
"predisposed to favor one side or another in the contest for political power and then mask
their partisanship by deploying the elastic rhetoric of neutrality." Richard W. Hurd, Il-
dustrial Relations Theory, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 305, 305-06 (2005) (reviewing LEO
TROY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE OLD UNIONISM (2004)). See also, CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra
note 183, at 17-21 (cataloguing labor's move to the left). See also Hutchison, Reclailliingl
the First Amniendient, supra note 309, at 712. Labor unions enhance this predisposition by
"direct[ing] their attention to political solutions," as their "fortunes [fade] in the market-
place." Allison R. Hayward, Benthami & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountability
in How We Vote 1, 2 (2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
316. Hayward, supra note 315, at 25.
317. Id. at 34.
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check list to detect the fraud.3" Dispensing with secret ballot elections""
magnifies the probability that workers will capitulate to fraudulent or bel-
ligerent union requests to sign cards."' The proposed law also does not
provide a mechanism permitting workers to update their preferences with
respect to unionization, which means that if some workers change their
minds about unionization, the remaining fraction of workers favoring the
union will be able to force representation on the majority.
32 '
Eviscerating the secret ballot corresponds with labor advocates' "de-
sire to accelerate 'social progress' created by building a transformative
'social movement' that does not 'rely ... on workers' ability to freely
choose or reject [unions].' "22 Recalling the romantic revolutionary sen-
timents that preceded the rise of the Age of Terror, and the ideals of
progressive New Deal reformers who saw themselves as members of the
philosophical vanguard during the 1930s, contemporary labor advocates
today rely on centralized government power to promote unionization,
based on the presumption that their preferences reflect the actual desires
of workers?.'3 The willingness of elites to impose their preferences favor-
ing collectivism instantiates one scholar's worst fears: an imposed ethos
divined by prophetic avatars that is "never checked against actual opinions,
least of all those of the most disadvantaged ... people."'2 - Reflecting the
legitimacy of such fears, emerging evidence shows that many see union
dues primarily as a vehicle to rescue unions from their currently mori-
bund state.' These people also see dues as a predicate to the voluntary or
involuntary enlistment of additional workers in an ideological attempt to
achieve radical class consciousness and societal transformation.2
318. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 1, at
67-73.
319. For a discussion of this possibility, see id. (questioning whether signatures ob-
tained through a process that is largely controlled by labor unions gives rise to valid
results).
320. Id. at 69-73. Epstein shows that existing law treats union authorization cards as
irrevocable and proposed law does not allow workers to update their preference before
cards are submitted. If a worker at any time signs a card, then she is bound for the dura-
tion of the period. Accordingly, there could be a successful card authorization program
even though the requisite number of workers does not support the program at the time
the cards are submitted.
321. Hutchison, Liberty, Liberalism and Neutrality, supra note 141, at 793.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES o. INJusTICE 115 (1990).
325. Hutchison, A Clearingt in ulie Forest, supra note 144, at 1371 (discussing such
views).
326. Id. at 1375.
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It is highly doubtful that the progressive viewpoint corresponds to
the views of most Americans or most workers. 27 As noted, a societal
transformation of the type sought after by the labor movement is unlikely
to yields benefits for rank and file members. Moreover, though some un-
ion proponents support EFCA and other pro-union efforts on grounds
that it might arrest income declines'21- the fact that unions diminish wages
for African Americans undermines this claim. Though unions frequently
raise wages for covered workers, they tend to diminish income for African
Americans and other displaced individuals. Wage legislation amplifies the
displacement effect of labor cartels."' Since it "is hard to imagine any
process that is less democratic in either intention or execution than the
card-check rule under EFCA, 3 it is hard to believe that this new policy
will be free of the subordinating effects of past labor policy While only a
fraction of workers are likely to receive pecuniary benefits from EFCA
through increased wages, the "only clear winners of this skewed and ex-
pedited process are members of the union leadership, who gain in dues
and power through a successful certification campaign.""'
' -
Evidence of intent to discriminate is not necessary to understand
the exclusionary impact of EFCA. While labor's history is richly infused
with evidence that the intent to discriminate repeatedly supplied the im-
petus for labor law reform, EFCA's exclusionary force stems simply from
the statute's capacity to exclude and maintain the labor movement's re-
markable pattern of subordination. Traditional notions of intent do not
reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large
part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional nor unin-
tentional.33 2 Whether a decisionmaker consciously seeks a particular
outcome, whether an outcome manifests her unconscious beliefs that are
attached to exclusionary attitudes, or whether it reflects blameworthy dis-
criminatory intent, EFCA is tied to three related goals. First, the proposal
327. See, e.g., Margalioth, supra note 137, at 41-49 (showing that American workers
are increasingly attracted to expressive individualism, which concentrates on subjective
self-realization, and are less likely to be attracted to collective action that requires individ-
ual interest to yield to group interest and solidarity).
328. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra
note 1, at 10-13 (showing that data from the period occurring between 1947 to 2007
supports the inference that income is largely related to productivity as opposed to unioni-
zation).
329. See, e.g., Christopher Dodds, Unions Use a Racist Law on Projects: Prevailiuiq-wvage
Measures Discriminate Against Minorities and Increase Costs, PHILLY.COM, Apr. 23, 2009,
available at http://www.printhis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=Unions+use+a
+racist+law+; see also Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Refonnist Conception of Mininumni
Wae Reimnes, supra note 51, at 93-134.
330. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 1, at
73.
331. Id.
332. Lawrence, supra note 59, at 322.
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aims to increase the power of union leaders over the lives of workers,
while diminishing the power of employers and vitiating the freedom of
workers to choose or reject unionization. Second, the statute seeks to ex-
pand the number of union members. And third, the proposal would
increase union dues revenues and consequently expand labor's political
influence by funding legislation, preferred political candidates, and union
advocacy. Taken as a whole this process would yield benefits for the self-
interested few at the expense of the many.-"'
Consider one contemporary example illustrating this point. Since
construction began on the Philadelphia Convention Center, the city's
Black construction workers have protested the lack of opportunity for
minority workers on public construction projects. ' Pennsylvania's pre-
vailing wage law, passed in 1961 and fashioned after the federal Davis-
Bacon Act, is the root cause behind the limited number of Black workers
on city funded projects." ' Unwilling to risk losing political support from
unions by challenging their discriminatory hiring practices, Mayor Nutter
chose instead to issue a report on minority hiring goals."" As written and
applied, Pennsylvania's wage law honors the legacy of Robert Bacon, co-
author of the Davis-Bacon Act. Bacon denied anti-African American
animus, but made clear his discomfort with "defective" workers taking
jobs that "belonged" to White union men.' 7 Drafters of Pennsylvania's
statute initially designed it to limit opportunities for out-of-state Black
workers,"" but this process has now been inverted. Instead of preventing
Black workers in other states from taking construction jobs in Philadel-
phia, this law allows unions to ship mostly White workers from other
states to the city in order to prevent Pennsylvania's Black laborers from
working on prevailing wage projects." Even if a trustworthy judge could
strip the prevailing wage policy of its racist heritage, its exclusionary effect
remains intact. As Critical Race Reformists show, the degree of blame-
worthiness does not necessarily limit the capacity of a policy to stifle
Black progress. Pennsylvania's wage law enhances the economic returns
333. See Hutchison, A Clcaritig in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1391. Union support
for abortion rights can be readily seen as problematic from an African American perspec-
tive because abortion was originally part of a eugenic racial project. See GOLD3BERG,
LIBERAL FAscisM, supra note 10, at 270-77. Evidence shows that Planned Parenthood, the
nation's largest abortion provider, accepts financial donations targeted specifically toward
the destruction of unborn African Amencan babies. Bob Unruh, Planned Parenthood:
Watitingfeuer Blacks 'understandable,' WORLDNETDAILY, Mar. 10, 2010, available at http://
www.wnd.com/index.php?fa= PAGE.printable&pageld=57526.
334. Dodds, supra note 329, at 1.
335. Id.
336. Id. (showing that Mayor suggested that minorities should attain thirty-two per-
cent of the jobs on large construction projects).
337. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 9, at 192.
338. Dodds, supra note 329, at 1.
339. Id.
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and social status that accrue to White workers and dislocates Black work-
ers, thereby eviscerating their economic and social status. "" Even if
prevailing wage law appears neutral and progressive to the local building
trades union, Critical Race Reformist analysis shows that racism and ex-
clusion persist.
"An acorn is not essentially something small with a point at one end
and cap at the other; it is something aimed at being an oak.' 14 ' Labor un-
ions that make political contributions function similarly. John Sweeney,
while serving as president of the AFL-CIO, proclaimed that labor unions
would tie their organizing to politics. This intertwining of organizing ca-
pacity and political power is consistent with Gary Becker's conclusion
that "[p]olitical influence is not fixed by the political process but can be
expanded by expenditures of time and money on campaign contributions,
political advertising, and in other ways that exert political pressure! " 2 It
is important to note that "individual human beings are not animated sim-
ply by pecuniary gain. They are also animated by ideological and social
objectives that provide self-interested ... benefits." ' At times economic,
social, and political concerns intertwine, suggesting that labor union ac-
tion in Pennsylvania, which maintains exclusion via prevailing wage
legislation, reflects the triumph of a progressive conception of social Dar-
winism that provides a convenient defense of the subjugation of Blacks in
America."' Union organizing efforts are the acorn that is directed toward
a sharp expansion in union dues revenues in order to achieve an oak: con-
testable political influence1 15 that can be transmuted into economic
benefits or other self-interested gains for union leaders and the majority
of workers. 4' Satisfying elite preferences such as radical class conscious-
ness 4 7 and workplace democracy.4 . or, alternatively, the cravings of a
majority of the rank and file for exclusion, will not further the interests of
340. See, e.g., Matthew Teague, Philadelphia: The Last Union Town,, PHILADELPHIA
MAG., Jan. 27, 2008, at 9, available at http://www.phillymag.com/scripts/print/
article.php?asset idx=219005 (suggesting that a majority of the Philadelphia City Council
was elected with the help of the building trades).
341. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW: A GUIDE 23 (2003).
342. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 144, at 1317-18 (internal citation
removed).
343. Id. at 1318.
344. FRANKLIN, supra note 54, at 63 (explaining this move).
345. On this possibility, see Hutchison, A ClearingL in the Forest, supra note 144, at
1318.
346. Id. at 1391.
347. For a description of the move toward radical class consciousness within the
labor movement, see Harry G. Hutchison, Toward a Robust Conception of "lndependentJudg-
ment": Back to the Future?, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 335-38, 353-58 (2002).
348. Aniong the goals that unions and union advocates seek is somne version of
workplace democracy. For a description of workplace democracy, see Klare, supra note
49, at 12.
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members of marginalized groups. On the contrary, it fortifies the conclu-
sion that the relationship between unions and people of color is an ill
fit.
34 '
EFCA ought to raise suspicion because it is advanced by poignant
claims of achieving fairness and raising wages and benefits for all workers,
despite a contemporary expansion in union objectives unrelated to col-
lective bargaining. "" Rather than a gift to workers, EFCA is an
endowment for union oligarchs. Following a familiar pathway found in
most liberal democracies, unions and union leaders have become "special-
interest" adjuncts to political allies, while often failing to serve the actual
interests of their members.-5" Instead of serving the interests of all mem-
bers or inventing measures designed to reduce racial exclusion, union
autocrats have commenced a process to capture additional union dues
revenues to finance more political influence in order to achieve a particu-
lar way of life for the nation that is bounded by the rhetoric of
transformation and social justice. Frustrated by the unwillingness of work-
ers to permit unions to speak for them and fearing looming political
irrelevancy,"' labor union leaders have placed considerable resources in
the fight to exchange the existing secret ballot for a card check policy. But
frustration and fear of political irrelevancy are not principled bases to en-
act EFCA.
EFCA's true purpose has little to do with a principle. The focus on
suspect claims such as social justice coupled with the refusal by legislators
and advocates to consider the proposal's adverse effects on members of
disadvantaged communities marks EFCA with contradiction. Rather than
delivering social justice and equality, EFCA is likely to deliver the oppo-
site. Critical Race Reformist analysis shows that EFCA is tied to labor's
history of conscious and unconscious racism and the empirical evidence
indicates that this proposal will impede the rate of racial progress for Afri-
can Americans. Americans should beware of accepting EFCA, which in
essence is what the Germans refer to as Ein Danaergeschenk-a "fatal gift"
that brings misfortune.
3 3
349. McUsic & Selni, supra note 314, at 1351.
350. See, e.g., C11AVEZ & GRAY, supra note 183, at 18 (discussing the various social
causes that labor unions support).
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CONCLUSION
The liberal-legalist order . . . will be founded on self-
interested, rights-bearing, adversarial individuals and this will
not be sustainable. This type of social order is likely to aggra-
vate precisely those points of tension in society which any
vibrant political process should aim at alleviating. The ulti-
mate danger is that liberal-legalism may, paradoxically, bring
about the precise end-despotism--which it is designed to
avoid.
3
5
4
Stanley Crouch, commenting on the Constitution, said the blues is
"music about human will and human frailtyjust as the brilliance of the
Constitution is that it recognizes grand human possibility with the same
clarity that it does human frailty, which is why ... it has a tragic base." '
He maintains that nothing is innately good, and that nothing is lasting
other than the perpetual danger of abused power.3' This offers an excel-
lent framework for understanding EFCA. No matter how many
statements of support proponents muster and no matter how frequently
progressive elites invoke the rhetoric of social justice and societal trans-
formation, EFCA is a legislative proposal that sustains racial and
economic disadvantage, just as similar laws did in the New Deal United
States and in pre-Mandela South Africa. The exclusion of certain work-
ers through government-sponsored unionization creates an aristocracy
for others. 5 The purpose of these legislative behaviors is to force a spe-
cific exchange-"to take from some people more than they get in
exchange, in order to provide benefits to those who control the levers of
political power."3 ' Shimmering with contradiction and following a pat-
tern initiated by the Progressives during the New Deal, labor legislation
reifies a racial hierarchy that inflicts itself on America's marginalized. To-
day, no advocates of racial hierarchy step forward to support EFCA.
However, the proposal can be tied to the consequences of the labor
movement's history emphasizing social control of "unemployables" and
other blatantly racist behavior. This proposal is yet another way to sup-
press the rate of progress of African Americans. If enacted, EFCA will
validate the brand of social Darwinism that excludes an "inferior class of
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labourers'"" and verify that modern liberal democracy is insufficient to
protect disfavored subgroups and individuals from the coercive power
authorized by the majority and its hierarchs. ',
359. HUTr, supra note 197, at 10.
360. See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUEsTIONS: TRUTH, MEANING & PUBLIC
DEBATE 149 (2002) (discussing John Stuart Mill).
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